This article applies economic analysis to rural households in poor countries to see what one may mean by a "population problem." It is argued that there is a serious population problem in certain regions of the world, and that it is in varying degrees linked to poverty, to gender inequalities in the exercise of power, to communal sharing of child-rearing, and to an erosion of the local environmental-resource base. It is argued that some of the links may, to an extent, be synergistic. One manifestation of the problem is that very high fertility rates are experienced by women bearing risks of death that should now be unacceptable. An argument is sketched to show how the cycle of poverty, low birth-weight and stature, and high fertility rates can perpetuate within a dynasty. The one general policy conclusion that emerges is that a population policy in these parts should not only contain such measures as family-planning programs, improved female education, and employment opportunities, but also those measures that are directed at the alleviation of poverty, such as improved credit, insurance, and savings opportunities, and a ready availability of basic household needs, such as potable water and fuel. It is argued that these latter measures lower the net private benefits of procreation.

Journal Article On the Concept of Optimum Population Get access P. S. Dasgupta P. S. Dasgupta Trinity Hall, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 3, July 1969, Pages 295–318, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296429 Published: 01 July 1969 Article history Received: 15 May 1968 Received: 15 January 1969 Published: 01 July 1969

Journal Article Optimum Growth when Capital is Non-transferable Get access P. S. Dasgupta P. S. Dasgupta Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 1, January 1969, Pages 77–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296344 Published: 01 January 1969 Article history Received: 10 July 1967 Revision received: 10 June 1968 Published: 01 January 1969

We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer's information can be represented as a one-dimensional signal. When a buyer's information is multidimensional, no auction is generally efficient. Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases, our auction is constrained-efficient in the sense of being efficient subject to incentive constraints.

J. E. Stiglitz, P. Dasgupta; Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency12, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 2, 1 April 1971, P

Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin; On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1