Credit contractions are costly, but policymakers have limited tools to counter them. In this paper, we examine the efficacy of public credit guarantees as antidotes to a credit crunch by studying the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We find that the program averted a historic credit crunch at a time when banks were unlikely to meet firm credit needs by risking their own capital. Our evaluation incorporates selection effects emanating from banks’ participation decision on both the extensive and intensive margins. Risk-aversion, rather than profitability, motivated bank participation in the program. Indeed, even as the program boosted loan growth among participants, it attenuated profitability.

Ongoing financial innovation raises the specter of banking and payment crises. Little aggregate evidence exists on the repercussions of substantial suspensions of payments. State-level experiments fill this gap. Four times in the last forty years, U.S. governors suspended payments from state-insured depositories. Rhode Island’s deposits crisis (1991), which was large, prolonged, and occurred during a recession, substantially lengthened and deepened the downturn. Deposits freezes in Nebraska (1983), Ohio (1985), and Maryland (1985), which were short and occurred during expansions, had little macroeconomic impact. Data sparsity inhibits analysis of these events with standard methods. To perform inference, we develop a novel Bayesian method for synthetic control, which generates output useful for policymakers and theorists. Our findings suggest policies that ensure institutions continue to process payments on a business-as-usual basis at all times have substantial value.