ABSTRACT The replacement of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) by Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) creates a natural experiment that sheds light on (1) potential inefficiencies caused by regulatory responses to a political crisis and (2) audit efficiency and effectiveness improvements resulting from the risk‐based approach embodied in AS5. We study these effects by examining the impact of AS5 on audit fees. We find that AS5 audit fees are aligned with auditee fraud risk, but not AS2 audit fees. Second, relative to AS2 benchmark levels, AS5 audit fees are, on average, lower for all auditees. Third, relative to AS2 benchmarks, AS5 fees are lower for lower‐fraud‐risk auditees but greater for higher‐fraud‐risk auditees. Overall, the evidence is consistent with (1) initial overregulation (via AS2) followed by reform (via AS5) and (2) auditors deploying a risk‐based audit approach to obtain both efficiency and potential effectiveness gains in audit production.

Abstract We present the first large‐sample empirical evidence on U.S. auditors' responses to changes in entity‐level audit risk during 2006–2007, the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Treating fiscal year 2005 engagements as a pre‐crisis benchmark, we find that audit attention during fiscal year 2006 and 2007 bank audit engagements shifted in line with the shifting audit risks. One implication of these findings is that auditors were able to recognize and respond to financial statement impacts of the macroeconomic shocks that unfolded during the lead‐up to the crisis. Another implication is that auditors' failure to issue advance warnings of increasing auditee riskiness during the time leading up to the financial crisis more likely reflects limitations of extant accounting and auditing rules rather than a lack of auditor awareness or attention to those risks.