We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

This article measures the economic impacts of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbours in rural Kenyan villages. We conduct a lab experiment in which we randomly vary the observability of investment returns to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden. We find that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment, though that strategy reduces their expected earnings. This effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment. Parameter estimates suggest that women anticipate that observable income will be “taxed” at a rate above 4%; this effective tax rate nearly doubles when kin can observe income directly. At the village level, we find an association between the willingness to forgo expected return to keep income hidden in the laboratory experiment and worse economic outcomes outside the laboratory.

We evaluate two interventions targeting young women in Nairobi, Kenya. The first is a multifaceted program involving vocational training, in-kind transfers of physical capital, and ongoing mentoring. The second is an unrestricted cash grant. Both interventions shift women into self-employment, and impacts persist after six years. Both programs also increase income in the short-term, but those effects disappear over time. Though the two treatments have similar impacts on labor market outcomes, women in the multifaceted program report significantly higher wellbeing six years after treatment relative to both women in the control group and those who received the grants.