Preunemployment search is the fundamental labor market process generating beneficial effects of advance notice. Yet theory indicates that workers receiving notice may not search, whereas others may search even without advance notice. Our weighted results indicate that over one-third of all nonnotified workers still search and over 40% of workers receiving notice do not respond by searching. Further, preunemployment search determinants differ for notified (nonnotified) workers and men (women). For notified men, search is strongly increased by longer notice and strongly decreased by higher unemployment insurance benefits. But neither factor affects the employed search decisions of notified women.

We use unique data to analyze employer tax compliance with Unemployment Insurance (UI) provisions. The data indicate that employers may have underreported $728 million of UI taxes nationally in 1987 alone. To formally examine this noncompliance, a theoretical model of payroll tax evasion is developed showing that increasing payroll tax rates, among other things, likely increases noncompliance by risk-neutral firms. This prediction is empirically verified. The finding that UI tax evasion is systematically related to various firm characteristics suggests that UI audits may be effectively targeted by statistical profiles derived from our model, thereby improving compliance.

This study was begun while the author was on a Brookings Economic Policy Fellowship in the Office of Economic Research of the Economic Development Administration. Acknowledgements are due Paul L. Burgess, Richardj Cebula, James A. Chalmers, Herbert M. Kaufman, Todd Sandler, WalterJ Wadycki, and the referees for this journal, all of whom have made helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper and none of whom bears any responsibility for remaining shortcomings.