Why do fire sales occur if many risks are hedgeable? We study a version of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, American Economic Review 104, 379–421) in which all fundamental risks can be hedged frictionlessly. Our analysis shows that fire sales are inherently self‐fulfilling. Fundamental shocks can never cause fire sales, and an efficient, safe equilibrium exists. On the other hand, there exists an equilibrium in which agents coordinate fire sales on nonfundamental shocks. A simple refinement based on vanishingly small perceived fundamental risk eliminates the safe equilibrium and selects the fire‐sale equilibrium as the unique outcome.

Two intermediary-based factors—a corporate bond dealer inventory measure and a broad intermediary distress measure—explain more than 40% of the puzzling common variation in credit spread changes beyond canonical structural factors. A simple intermediary-based model with partial market segmentation accounts for intermediary factors’ explanatory power and delivers three further implications with empirical support. First, whereas bond sorts on risk-related variables produce monotonic loading patterns on intermediary factors, non-risk-related sorts produce no pattern. Second, dealer inventory comoves with corporate-credit assets only, whereas intermediary distress comoves with both corporate-credit and non-corporate-credit assets. Third, dealers’ inventory responds to (instrumented) bond sales by institutional investors.