The Consumption Function — a “fundamental psychological law,” 281. —The time-preference postulate — another “fundamental psychological law,” 285. — Is the pure interest rate already zero? 292. — Conclusions, 294.

Introduction, 473. — I. Prosperity, 474. — Financial ties, 474. — Accounting practices, 478. — Control, 481. — II. Transition, 484. — Facing depression, 486. — Plan adopted: first step, 489; second step, 492. — III. The Decline; financial, 497; physical, 501; the employees and the community, 504. — IV. Liquidation, 507. — The question of responsibility, 511.

Journal Article Mr. Keynes's Consumption Function: Rejoinder Get access G. R. Holden G. R. Holden Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 52, Issue 4, August 1938, Pages 709–712, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885042 Published: 01 August 1938

While the corporation has contributed much to economic development, it is not fundamentally an economic entity, nor is the legal corporation fundamentally an accounting entity. For purposes of economics and accounting, the corporation might well be viewed as a group of individuals associated for the purpose of business enterprise, so organized that its affairs are conducted through representatives. Numerous illustrations may be cited of instances in which this latter, or representative, viewpoint has been taken even by the law and the courts and in its attempt to control the development of trusts, the law has frequently found it necessary to go behind the corporate fiction and prescribe penalties for corporate officers as well as for the corporation. The income-tax law and regulations dispense with the corporate entity in the principle of constructive ownership, in the imposition of a tax upon corporations for improperly accumulating surplus and of a surtax on personal holding companies.

Reviews the book "Business Mathematics: An Introductory Textbook," by J. Donald Watson.

I. Scope of the study and nature of the data, 367.—II. The extent of management ownership, 372.— Ownership by directors and operating executives, 376.—III. Ownership of the remaining voting stock, 379.— IV. Analysis of outside holdings separately, 383.— Problems of intercorporate ownership, 385.— V. Analysis of holdings by management and outside groups combined, 388.— VI. Proportion of all stock outstanding held by control groups, 390.— VII. Summary and conclusions, 396.