This article examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the allocation of labor across industries. An overlooked aspect of UI is the effect of imperfect experience rating on hiring. Firms in more stable industries generally pay more into the UI system than their workers ever receive in benefits, thus subsidizing more volatile industries. The results indicate that industry employment shares are significantly affected by UI and that there is a net shift of resources from the service industry to the construction industry. The estimates also imply that layoff unemployment is increased by about 5% because of UI-induced employment shifts.

Analyst forecasts, Earnings forecast error persistence, Analyst forecast revisions

This paper studies determinants of the geographic distribution of unemployment in the United States since 1950. We argue that “equilibrium” differences in unemployment among markets are partially supported by corresponding differences in the covariance structure of sectoral demands for labor. When workers are mobile, greater diversification of sectoral demands reduces unemployment. We confirm this point using pooled time-series-cross-section data on state unemployment and employment by industry. We also find evidence for nonneutrality of aggregate disturbances based on geographic differences in industrial composition, and that permanent changes in the sectoral composition of employment lead to transitory fluctuations in unemployment.

Nicholas Dopuch, Ronald R. King, The Impact of MAS on Auditors' Independence: An Experimental Markets Study, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29, Studies on Accounting Institutions in Markets and Organizations (1991), pp. 60-98

This article is concerned with the determinants of English-language fluency among immigrants and the effects of fluency on earnings. Using special survey data on a sample of over eight hundred aliens, the analysis shows the importance of certain variables not previously available, speaking fluency at migration and English reading fluency. English speaking and reading fluency both increase with duration in the United States, and the increase with duration is greater for those with more schooling and who are not Hispanic. The article shows that reading fluency is more important than speaking fluency as a determinant of earnings.

This paper presents the results of 16 laboratory markets designed to test the theoretical assertion that, when disclosures are credible, managers/sellers will fully disclose private information to potential investors/buyers. Sellers are predicted to disclose all information so as not to be classified as having the worst possible information. This experiment manipulated two treatments: the number of disclosure options available to the seller and the buyers' knowledge of those disclosure options. The results show that, after repeated dealings between sellers and buyers, the sellers moved toward full disclosure. Buyers adjusted their bidding strategies in response to the seller's disclosure strategy in all markets except those that had both (1) a large number of disclosure options and (2) no knowledge by buyers of the disclosure options. These results may provide some perspective on the market‐based results that show that investors do not react in a fully skeptical fashion with respect to managerial disclosures. Our results suggest that knowledge of the menu of disclosure options may increase the speed of markets adjusting to disclosures, particularly when the menu of disclosure options is large. Résumé. Les auteurs présentent les résultats de l'étude en laboratoire de seize marchés à partir desquels ils ont voulu vérifier l'affirmation théorique selon laquelle, lorsque l'information communiquée est vraisemblable, les gestionnaires‐vendeurs présentent intégralement l'information privilégiée aux investissieurs‐acheteurs potentiels. La décision des vendeurs de communiquer intégralement l'information serait motivée par leur désir de ne pas laisser supposer que l'information qu'ils possèdent est extrêmement négative. Dans le cadre de cette expérience, les auteurs ont abordé la question sous deux angles: le nombre d'options dont dispose le vendeur en matière de présentation de l'information et la connaissance de ces différentes options chez l'acheteur. Les résultats démontrent qu'après plusieurs séances de négociation entre vendeurs et acheteurs, les vendeurs consentaient à la présentation intégrale de l'information. Les acheteurs adaptaient leur stratégie d'offre en réponse à la stratégie de présentation de l'information du vendeur dans tous les marchés, à l'exception des marchés caractérisés à la fois par 1) un nombre important d'options de présentation de l'information et 2) aucune connaissance, chez les acheteurs, des options de présentation de l'information. Ces résultats pourraient ouvrir certaines perspectives en ce qui a trait aux résultats, fondés sur le marché, qui démontrent que les investisseurs ne mettent pas systématiquement en doute l'information présentée par les gestionnaires. Les résultats de l'étude laissent supposer que la connaissance des différentes options de présentation de l'information peut accélérer l'adaptation des marchés à la présentation de l'information, en particulier lorsque les options de présentation sont nombreuses.

In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as 'sunshine trading'. Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distributions of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.

The paper deals with stabilization as a one-shot problem to ask what "credibility" means in a world where programs will succeed with probability one. A model is spelled out where the equilibrium program has some ex ante probability of failure. The model draws attention to the factors that raise or lower the probability of success of a stabilization program and thus offers a positive theory of stabilization. Reputation that emerges as a central element in repeated games has no role in this model.