A competitive, dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied. The main assumptions are that entry is sequential, that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market and that better information becomes available as time goes on. The gradual improvement in information is due to the fact that later waves of entrants are able to observe the profitability of earlier entrants. The major results reported here (under suitable restrictions) are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time, and that—at any given point in time—it is smaller than the socially optimal one.

We investigate the ability of the price system to aggregate private information in a market of uncertain size and where set-up costs are incurred by entrants. It is shown that the equilibrium is random even when the totality of private information is so large that aggregate uncertainty is virtually non-existent. In particular, the limiting equilibrium does not approach the full-information, Walrasian outcome. Hence, the model identifies a technological factor (increasing returns) which gives rise to informational losses.

This paper investigates the interaction between bidding for procurementprograms and fractional buys. This problem is analyzed from the standpoint of a cost-minimizing procuring agent. It is shown that underimperfect competition, a multiple-source purchase is generally preferred to a single-source contract. Similarly, the author demonstrates that a (strictly) intermediate cost sharing arrangement, i.e., an incentive contract, dominates either the cost-plus or the firm-fixed price arrangements. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28.

This paper analyzes a decentralized process for the diffusion of knowledge. In equilibrium, the economy converges from an initial distribution of knowledge over agents to the steady-state distribution, which is unique. Because of the public good aspect of information, too little learning takes place, and ideas are implemented too early. The key difference between earlier formulations of search externalities by Diamond, Mortensen, and Spence on the one hand, and our own on the other, is that here spillovers of knowledge depend not only on how hard people are trying, but also on the differences in what they know: if all of us know the same thing, we cannot learn from each other. The model also addresses the following two substantive questions: first, the relationship between inequality and growth, noted some time ago by Kuznets, and second, the effect on growth of improvements in the communication technology.

This paper explores a model of innovation and spatial competition over time. A key implication of the paper is that firms' size is positively autocorrelated across time. The mechanism that generates this persistence works only in heterogenous-product markets and is based on the idea that larger firms possess better information about the design of future products. Some corroborating evidence is cited.

We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations.The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked-as usual-to their current relative success, but mutations-which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution-are present as well.Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation.The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we term "long-run equilibria."For 2 x 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the equilibrium selected satisfies (for large populations) Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) criterion of risk-dominance.In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium.

We explore entry into a foreign market with uncertain demand growth. A multinational can serve the foreign demand by two modes, or by a combination thereof: it can export its products, or it can create productive capacity via foreign direct investment (FDI). The advantage of FDI is that it allows for lower marginal cost than exporting does. The disadvantage is that FDI is irreversible and, hence, entails the risk of creating under-utilized capacity in the case that the market turns out to be small. The presence of demand uncertainty and irreversibility gives rise to an interior solution, where the multinational, under certain conditions, both exports its products and does FDI.

A model of gradual reputation formation through a process of continuous investment in product quality is developed. We assume that the ability to produce high‐quality products requires continuous investment and that as a consequence of informational frictions, such as search costs, information about firms’ past performance diffuses only gradually in the market. This leads to a dual process of growth of a firm’s customer base and an increase in the firm’s investment in quality. The model predicts, therefore, that the longer its tenure as a high‐quality producer, the more a firm invests in quality. We relate this finding to empirical work on online commerce as well as on traditional industries.