We investigate the impact of financial crises on the syndicated loan spreads applied to public and private firms. We found evidence of a greater increase in loan spreads for European public firms than for private ones during the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that public firms’ borrowing costs are more sensitive to financial market swings than those of private companies. Our results hold when we control for relationship banking effects, a different sample composition between crisis and non-crisis periods, estimating a propensity score matching, and adopting a sample of syndicated loans to US public firms.

We verify the effects of sovereign rating revisions on the activity of European banks, in terms of their regulatory capital ratio, profitability, liquidity, and lending supply. First, we find that a sovereign downgrade has a significant impact, primarily on capital ratios and lending supply. In contrast, upgrades do not have a significant impact, indicating an asymmetric effect of sovereign rating changes. Second, we find that three transmission channels (assets channel, funding channel, and rating channel) explain a relevant part of the impact of a sovereign downgrade. Finally, we find strong evidence that the rating-based regulation affects all measures of the activity of domestic banks, causing negative externalities for financial institutions. Our results hold also controlling for sovereign risk, estimating a GMM system, and employing an instrumental variable approach.

This paper provides evidence that central banks’ purchase programmes of corporate bonds in the aftermath of market stress foster risk-taking by bond funds. Using the COVID-19 shock as a laboratory, we show that funds more exposed to pandemic-related asset purchase programmes took on more credit and liquidity risks than less exposed ones during 2020, generating higher returns and attracting more inflows. More exposed funds increased their risk-taking buying assets not eligible for central banks’ interventions, particularly when they under-performed their peers or held less liquid assets. These results suggest that asset purchase programmes affected risk-taking by reducing liquidation costs and, thus, lowering the risk of run by fund investors. We discuss the implications for the transmission of policy interventions during periods of market stress and the regulation of the investment fund sector.