We find that relative to fundamentals, dual-class firms trade at lower prices than do single-class firms, both at the IPO and for at least the subsequent 5 years. The lower prices attached to duals do not foreshadow abnormally low stock or accounting returns. Moreover, some types of CEO turnover are less frequent among duals, and in general CEO turnover is sensitive to firm performance for singles but not for duals. Finally, when duals unify their share classes, statistically and economically significant value gains occur. Collectively, our results suggest that the governance associated with dual-class equity influences the pricing of duals.

We analyze the price impact of an exogenous share sale of inside blockholders who were forced to sell a part of their shareholdings following a regulatory change in India. The affected firms experience a negative excess return of 4.3% during the issue week. Crucially, the price impact reverses within around 16 days of the event. Our results are consistent with the view that long-term demand curves for stocks are flat; this view is echoed in classical finance theories. The short-term price reaction to a sale is probably due to temporary price pressure.