Since the early 1980's, patterns of emergingmarket finance have changed significantly. Greater integration of capital markets and a trend toward a greater use of direct lending through bonds has led to relatively decreased use of indirect finance through syndicated bank loans. These changes have produced benefits to investors through opportunities for risk diversification and to emerging-market sovereign borrowers by increasing the investor base. The broadened investor base in bond financing, however, raises problems of coordination and collective action in the event of a sovereign borrower's default and restructuring. Now, three parties are involved in determining the debt markdown required to produce solvency: the debtor, creditors, and the global taxpayer through international financial institutions (IFI's). The complex relationships among the borrowers, creditors, and the global taxpayer have made restructuring obligations a costly and time-consuming exercise, especially with the possibility of holdouts. Both the sovereign borrower and its creditors have an incentive to avoid a restructuring in the hope of financial assistance from the global taxpayer. Sovereign governments may not undertake the politically painful steps involved in beginning a restructuring when there is always the hope that official assistance will be forthcoming. Creditors may not accept a reduction in the value of their claims, also in the hope that official assistance will be forthcoming. Costs of postponed and disorderly restructurings are real and substantial. Delays in restructuring can drain a country's resources and increase the ultimate costs of restoring financial sustainability. Creditors bear a burden as well, because the losses associated with the restructuring are reflected in values of

This paper looks into the history of economic thought to examine the forerunners of the "new monetary economics." This approach emphasizes the role of regulations on private financial intermediation in determining the particular institutional arrangements that contemporary monetary theory treats as data. The "new view" investigates the possibility that under laissez-faire the unit of account and means of payment, traditionally bundled together in the item called "money," may become separated. The earlier writers who share this perspective have been overlooked by historians of economic thought as well as by recent contributors to the new monetary economics. Many of the insights of these theorists are relevant to modern monetary theory.

We investigate the trade-off between the benefits from bank monitoring when a banker is represented on a firm's board and the costs from two sources: conflicts of interests between lenders and shareholders, and U.S. legal doctrines that generate lender liability for bankers on boards of firms in financial distress. Consistent with high costs of active involvement, bankers are on boards of large, stable firms with high proportions of collateralizable assets and low reliance on short-term financing. While permitting banks to own equity could mitigate conflicts, the protection of shareholder versus creditor rights could continue to reduce the role of U.S. banks in corporate governance.

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange‐listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.

Today's financial system is dominated by markets with institutions connected by short-term financing, securitization, derivatives, and other means. Yet regulations have focused on depositories, leaving regulators unprepared for the 2008 crisis. We suggest two key principles for regulatory reform. First, some changes in the financial system came as institutions lowered the burden of regulations through “regulatory arbitrage.” Reform needs to avoid driving businesses “into the shadows,” where risks may accumulate and sow seeds of future crises. Second, reform ought to improve transparency to reduce uncertainty and inter-linkages between players. We evaluate some of Dodd-Frank Act in light of these principles.

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual-to-stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital-impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual‐to‐stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital‐impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.