Auditing, Audit Fees, Audit-pricing, Legal liability

It is hypothesized that an Inverse relation exists between the reputation of the auditor of an Initial public offering and the initial return earned by an investor. Specifically, clients that hire more reputable CPA firms should exhibit lower initial returns than clients that choose to hire CPA firms with less reputation capital at stake. Two proxies for auditor reputation are used to test this hypothesis. The first reputation proxy uses indicator variables for auditor size. Results indicate that the widely used Big Eight/non-Big Eight classification may measure CPA firm reputation capital with error particularly for the smaller Big Eight end larger non-Big Eight firms. A second reputation proxy is developed by regressing compensation paid to the auditing firms on measures of marginal cost of performing the audit, The initial return to the IPO investors is regressed on the residual from the compensation regression to provide evidence of the reputation hypothesis. Results indicate that clients that pay a premium for their registration audit exhibit lower initial returns for their investors. Thus, the results of both tests provide support for the hypothesized inverse relation between auditor reputation and initial public offering initial return.

We hypothesize that a mandated accounting change (MAC) that disallows the deferral of revenues or capitalization of expenditures causes the aggregate deferred revenue and capitalized expenditure flows to fall below their levels prior to the change. In addition, the deferred revenue or capitalized expenditure flows after a MAC will exceed the pre‐MAC levels that would have resulted from formerly capitalizing or deferring these items. We discuss using deferred tax flows as a proxy for a firm's level of capitalization and deferral. Finally, we test our hypothesis by examining changes in deferred tax flows for a sample of firms that capitalized research and development costs prior to the promulgation of FAS2. The test results indicate that managers actively restored revenue flows and capitalized expenditures for the period immediately following FAS2. Second, smaller firms appear to be more active in this restoration process than larger firms. Finally, the decline in the rate of growth of depreciation for capitalizing firms suggests that managers may have influenced the capitalization of costs to restore earnings to pre‐FAS2 levels. Résumé. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle une modification comptable non discrétionnaire (MCND) par suite de l'interdiction du report de produits ou de la capitalisation de dépenses fait en sorte que les flux globaux des produits reportés et des dépenses capitalisées diminuent au‐dessous des niveaux qu'ils affichaient avant la modification. En outre, les flux de produits reportés ou de dépenses capitalisées après une MCND excéderont les niveaux qui auraient résulté de la capitalisation ou du report de ces éléments avant la MCND. Les auteurs traitent de l'utilisation des flux d'impôt reporté d'une entreprise à litre de substitut du niveau de capitalisation et de report. Enfin, ils vérifient leur hypothèse en examinant les changements des flux d'impôt reporté pour un échantillon d'entreprises qui ont capitalisé leurs frais de recherche et de développement avant la promulgation par le FASB de la Norme n o 2. Les résultats du test indiquent que les gestionnaires ont activement rétabli les flux de produits reportés et de dépenses capitalisées pendant la période suivant immédiatement la Norme n o 2. Deuxièmement, les entreprises plus petites semblent plus enclines à opérer ce processus de rétablissement que les entreprises plus grandes. Enfin, le déclin du taux de croissance de l'amortissement pour les entreprises qui recourent à la capitalisation donne à penser que les gestionnaires peuvent avoir joué sur la capitalisation des coûts pour ramener les bénéfices à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la Norme n o 2.

We document that an SEC investigation of an underwriter imposes indirect penalties on the underwriter and its past clients, particularly IPO clients. Targeted underwriters experience large declines in IPO market share and increased regulatory scrutiny and client risk after an SEC investigation is announced. Stock prices of clients decline significantly. We attribute these effects to a sudden deterioration in the value of the underwriter's reputation capital, suggesting that the general assumption in prior IPO research that underwriter reputation is stationary may be inappropriate. Our results also suggest that the SEC's power to institute investigations should be considered when designing optimal securities regulation.