Married women's labor force participation (LFP) increased dramatically in the United States between the 1940 and 1960 cohort. The two cohorts lived under different divorce regimes (unilateral divorce rather than mutual consent). The 1960 cohort also had a lower gender wage gap. We use a quantitative dynamic life-cycle model of endogenous marital status, calibrated to key statistics for the 1940 cohort, to study the effects of these two changes. We find that both drivers combined are able to account for over 50 percent of the increase in married women's LFP and also generate large movements in marriage and divorce rates.

Many states are implementing school-finance reforms which will have complex effects on income distribution, intergenerational income mobility, and welfare. This paper analyzes the static and dynamic effects of such reforms by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model of public-education provision and calibrating it using U.S. data. The authors examine the consequences of a reform of a locally financed system to a state-financed system which equalizes expenditures per student across districts. They find that this policy increases both average income and the share of income spent on education. Steady-state welfare increases by 3.2 percent of steady-state income.

We analyze five education finance systems: local, state, foundation, power equalizing with recapture (PER), and power equalizing without recapture (PEN). In a calibrated model, we find that finance systems have large effects on educational resources and equity. The trade‐off between equity and resources, however, is not monotone. Ranking systems by expected utility, we find that PER consistently ranks highest, though it provides fewer resources to education than the foundation and PEN systems and is less equitable than a state system. We prove that for an important subset of preferences, PER will win in majority voting comparisons with the other systems.

This paper examines the interactions between household formation, inequality, and per capita income. We develop a model in which agents decide to become skilled or unskilled and form households. We show that the equilibrium sorting of spouses by skill type (their correlation in skills) is an increasing function of the skill premium. In the absence of perfect capital markets, the economy can converge to different steady states, depending upon initial conditions. The degree of marital sorting and wage inequality is positively correlated across steady states and negatively correlated with per capita income. We use household surveys from 34 countries to construct several measures of the skill premium and of the degree of correlation of spouses' education (marital sorting). For all our measures, we find a positive and significant relationship between the two variables. We also find that sorting and per capita GDP are negatively correlated and that greater discrimination against women leads to more sorting, in line with the predictions of our model.