Merton (1973) in his seminal article ‘Theory of Rational Option Pricing’ showed that the rationally determined price of a call option is a non-decreasing function of the ‘riskness’ of its associated common stock. In deriving his results, Merton made restrictive assumptions about the way the market prices payoff distributions, and used the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) measure to compare the riskiness of securities. I show by means of an example that the Merton result will not in general be true. I then derive a sufficient condition for the option on one stock to have higher market value than the option on another stock, when both the stocks have the same price, and explain why the Merton result is valid in the Black-Scholes environment.

In this paper we extend the multigood futures pricing model of Grauer and Litzenberger [9] to a dynamic discrete time setting. We then test the model using data on futures prices for corn, wheat, and soybeans. The parameter estimates we obtain are similar to those obtained by other researchers using stock return data. The model itself is rejected and we offer some suggestions as to which assumption may be violated. We also give an interpretation to the Hansen‐Singleton nonlinear instrumental variables estimation technique used in our empirical work.

It is well documented that stock prices on ex-dividend days drop by less than the value of the dividend, on average. This has commonly been attributed to the effect of tax clienteles. We examine data from the Hong Kong stock market, where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed. As in the U.S., the average stock price drop is less than the value of the dividend; specifically, the average dividend for the period 1980–1993 is HK 0.12 and the average price drop is HK 0.06. We are able to account for this both theoretically and empirically through market microstructure arguments.

When consumption betas of stocks are computed using year‐over‐year consumption growth based upon the fourth quarter, the consumption‐based asset pricing model (CCAPM) explains the cross‐section of stock returns as well as the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model. The CCAPM's performance deteriorates substantially when consumption growth is measured based upon other quarters. For the CCAPM to hold at any given point in time, investors must make their consumption and investment decisions simultaneously at that point in time. We suspect that this is more likely to happen during the fourth quarter, given investors' tax year ends in December.

We provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts. Our analysis builds on two key features. First, insurance markets are unavailable for labor income. Second, the “due-on-sale” clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income. If explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law, points serve effectively as prepayment penalties. We also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan.

This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive “story” that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled. If individuals observe long “lines” at the bank, they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run. However, bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information. Extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations.

Globalization has increasingly made it possible for labor in developing countries to augment labor in the developed world, without having to relocate, in ways not thought possible only a few decades ago. We argue that this large increase in the developed world’s effective labor supply, triggered by geo-political events and technological innovations, coupled with the inability of existing institutions in the US and developing nations themselves to cope with this shock, set the stage for the great recession. The financial crisis in the US was but the first acute symptom.

While a number of countries have tried the use of sealed bid share auctions for initial public offerings (IPOs), few continue to use them. This is a puzzle, since auctions have been successfully used in a variety of situations for other financial securities, particularly for the sale of government bonds. We provide an explanation for this puzzle: Bidding in sealed bid auctions for new issues is complex, particularly when the underlying shares are difficult to value and the auction is open to large numbers of potential bidders, some of whom might be naïve. Participation fluctuations make it difficult for even sophisticated bidders to shave accurately for the winner’s curse, and mistakes by some bidders impose costs on all. Our findings suggest that a hybrid auction mechanism that limits participation in the auction tranche to sophisticated investors, along with a non-competitive tranche that is open to all investors, can reduce such mistakes while at the same time providing the necessary incentives for information gathering.

We find that on average, an announcement of rising unemployment is good news for stocks during economic expansions and bad news during economic contractions. Unemployment news bundles three types of primitive information relevant for valuing stocks: information about future interest rates, the equity risk premium, and corporate earnings and dividends. The nature of the information bundle, and hence the relative importance of the three effects, changes over time depending on the state of the economy. For stocks as a group, information about interest rates dominates during expansions and information about future corporate dividends dominates during contractions.