This study examines how government support influences firm behavior across profitability, investment, and employment. Using a comprehensive database linking local, state, and federal subsidies to firm-level financial data, we assess how different subsidy types shape firm decisions. We find that cost-reducing subsidies are more effective than revenue-increasing ones in boosting profitability, employment, and strategic investment. Firms that commit to hiring or capital investment upon receiving subsidies achieve superior outcomes. These findings highlight the importance of aligning subsidy design with firm-level incentives and broader economic goals.

This study examines how the appointment of former politicians and regulators to boards of directors or management teams influences corporate acquisition activity and performance. We find that bidders with political connections are more likely to acquire targets and avoid regulatory delay or denial. The merger premium paid increases with political connectedness. The announcement period returns show that investors recognize that bids by politically connected acquirers are more likely to create firm value. Connected bidders make more bids and bid on larger targets. Connected acquirers also enjoy superior post-merger financial and operating performance.