In labor market equilibrium, sectoral differences in "natural" rates of unemployment generate a conformable distribution of wage differentials that compensate workers for bearing unemployment risk. This paper offers new empirical evidence on the determinants of this equilibrium. The analysis consists of two stages. First, I estimate a three-state model of employment and unemployment that identifies the determinants of individuals' rates of entering and leaving unemployment spells. Sectoral, demographic, and policy-induced differences in unemployment probabilities evolve naturally from this framework. Second, I estimate the impact of these differences on the distribution of wages. An important finding is the powerful impact of the unemployment insurance (UK) system both on unemployment and on equalizing wage differences. The evidence is strong that the availability of UK increases unemployment, while simultaneously reducing the magnitude of compensating wage differentials. Most of the effect of UK on unemployment is due to an increased probability of entering spells of unemployment, mainly temporary layoffs, though the duration of spells is also affected. Neglect of the role of UK as a substitute for wages partially accounts for the small compensating differentials estimated in previous research. In the absence of UK, each point of anticipated unemployment raises an individual's wage by about 2.5%.

This paper studies the processes of wage and employment dynamics within local labor markets. The theoretical context is a dynamic spatial equilibrium among locales that is supported by incentives to migrate to markets offering the greatest present value of future earnings. Thus costly migration arbitrages geographic wage differences. Using a time series of cross-sectional files from the Current Population Surveys of 1977-79, I find that wages are sensitive to interarea differences in market conditions. A positive relative shock to local labor demand increases relative wages within a locale, but expectations of future demand actually reduce current wages because of increased current migration. Thus wages are more flexible in response to transitory changes in local market conditions than to permanent ones. Consistent with theory, wages are most flexible among the least mobile demographic groups, who are inelastically supplied across geographic areas.

Objective measures of employee performance are rarely available. Instead, firms rely on subjective judgments by supervisors. Subjectivity opens the door to favoritism, where evaluators act on personal preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others. Firms must balance the costs of favoritism--arbitrary rewards and less productive job assignments--against supervisors' demands for authority over subordinates. The authors analyze the conditions under which favoritism is costly to organizations and the effects of favoritism on compensation, the optimal extent of authority, and the use of bureaucratic rules.

We treat rising inequality as an equilibrium outcome in which human capital investment fails to keep pace with rising demand for skills. Investment affects skill supply and prices on three margins: the type of human capital in which to invest, how much to acquire, and the intensity of use. The latter two represent the intensive margins of human capital acquisition and utilization. These choices are substitutes for the creation of new skilled workers, yet they are complementary with each other, magnifying inequality. When skill-biased technical change drives economic growth, greater inequality reduces growth.

We define national security (NS) as public policies that protect the safety or welfare of a nation's citizens from substantial threats. NS capital provides societal insurance against widespread harm or catastrophe, so optimal NS investments may have very low expected rates of return. Investment targeted at extreme events (war) has spillovers, reducing potential harm in less threatening situations as well. Potential threats are highly uncertain, which raises the value of ex-post scalability of NS technologies. Higher probabilities of extreme events raise the demand for flexibility, so ex-post responses to threats are more elastic, but may reduce current precaution.

Murphy and Topel (2006, henceforth MT) develop methods for valuing health improvements based on individuals’ willingness to pay. Our results indicate that past health improvements have been enormously valuable. We estimate that gains in life expectancy over the twentieth century were worth more than $1.2 million per person to the current US population, and that rising longevity added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth between 1970 and 2000, as mortality rates among older adults fell sharply. Looking ahead, we estimate that even modest progress against major lifethreatening diseases would be extremely valuable. For example, the two most prominent causes of disease-related mortality in the United States are cardiovascular diseases (CVD) and cancer. We find that a permanent 10 percent reduction in mortality rates from CVD would be worth about $5.7 trillion to current and future Americans, while similar progress against cancer would be worth $4.7 trillion. A 10 percent reduction in overall mortality would be worth about $18 trillion. If past progress is an indication, there is little doubt that these or greater gains will eventually be realized. The questions are when and at what cost? In comparison to these prospective benefits of health progress, expenditures on basic and applied health research in the United States are modest. Public support for basic biomedical research—mainly through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and associated grants to research universities—totals about $28 billion annually. Adding expenditures on health research and development (R&D) by private institutions and by pharmaceutical and medical products companies brings the total for basic and applied health research to about $60 billion Social Value and the Speed of Innovation

We develop a framework for valuing improvements in health and apply it to past and prospective reductions in mortality in the United States. We calculate social values of (i) increased longevity over the twentieth century, (ii) progress against various diseases after 1970, and (iii) potential future progress against major diseases. Cumulative gains in life expectancy after 1900 were worth over $1.2 million to the representative American in 2000, whereas post-1970 gains added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth, equal to about half of GDP. Potential gains from future health improvements are also large; for example, a 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality would be worth $500 billion.

We analyze entry, pricing, and product design in a model with differentiated products. Market equilibrium can be “separating,” with multiple sellers and a sorting of heterogeneous consumers across goods, or “exclusionary,” with one seller serving all customer types. Entry into an initially monopolized market can occur because of cost reductions or product improvements, but entry need not lower the incumbent’s price, improve efficiency, or raise consumer welfare. Postentry design incentives favor a softening of price competition and stronger market segmentation, whereas exclusionary design changes typically raise consumer welfare. Potential, as distinct from actual, entry always benefits consumers.