Abstract This paper examines the effect of earnings announcements on information asymmetry as perceived by specialists. We use changes in quoted bid‐ask spreads and depths (relative to the average value in the non‐announcement period) as proxies for changes in information asymmetry in the market. To our knowledge, we are the first to employ a model that captures the simultaneous nature of the specialists' choice of spreads and depths in reaction to earnings news. We provide evidence that spreads are wider and depths are smaller before the release of earnings announcements. We also find that changes to depths are greater for announcements of quarterly earnings than for announcements of annual earnings and changes to spreads persist longer into the post‐announcement period when announcements are made outside trading hours. These changes to spreads and depths persist when earnings announcements are made after trading hours.

This paper examines the effect of earnings announcements on information asymmetry as perceived by specialists. We use changes in quoted bid-ask spreads and depths (relative to the average value in the non-announcement period) as proxies for changes in information asymmetry in the market. To our knowledge, we are the first to employ a model that captures the simultaneous nature of the specialists' choice of spreads and depths in reaction to earnings news. We provide evidence that spreads are wider and depths are smaller before the release of earnings announcements. We also find that changes to depths are greater for announcements of quarterly earnings than for announcements of annual earnings and changes to spreads persist longer into the post-announcement period when announcements are made outside trading hours. These changes to spreads and depths persist when earnings announcements are made after trading hours.

Using a sample of public and private banks, we study how social capital relates to bank stability. Social capital, which reflects the level of cooperative norms in society, is likely to reduce opportunistic behavior (Jha and Chen 2015; Hasan et al., 2017) and, therefore, act as an informal monitoring mechanism. Consistent with our expectations, we find that banks in high social capital regions experienced fewer failures and less financial trouble during the 2007–2010 financial crisis than banks in low social capital regions. In addition, we find that social capital was negatively associated with abnormal risk-taking and positively associated with accounting transparency and accounting conservatism in the pre-crisis period of 2000–2006, indicating that risk-taking, accounting transparency, and accounting conservatism are possible channels through which social capital affected bank stability during the crisis.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with 500 million or more in total assets (raised to 1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.