This paper shows that when uncertainty is taken into account explicitly, taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and individual savings incentives, basically unaffected, in spite of the sizable tax revenues collected. In some plausible situations, such taxes can increase efficiency. The explanation for these surprising results is that the government, by taxing capital income, absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return and the uncertainty in the return. While investors as a result receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects are largely offsetting.

Under the U. S. tax law, taxable income differs systematically from economic income when there is inflation. For example, nominal interest payments and nominal capital gains are taxable or tax deductible, and depreciation allowances are based on historic rather than replacement costs. Therefore, even fully anticipated inflation can have real effects. The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what degree an increase in the inflation rate, given these differences between taxable and economic income under existing tax law, ought to change corporate investment and financial policy, and cause capital gains or losses to existing owners of corporate equity.

In a Federal system of government, each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods. In this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision-making. In particular, we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents, through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions. The paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision-making.

ABSTRACT Optimal‐tax theory forecasts that small open economies should not tax capital income. Yet, countries do tax capital income. Why the inconsistency? This paper shows that use of the double‐taxation convention, whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic taxes, helps explain this inconsistency. In particular, capital income will be taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a Stackelberg leader when setting its tax policy. Due to the convention, other countries will then tax capital imports, making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter to tax capital income. Without a dominant capital exporter, however, the model still forecasts no capital‐income taxes.

In simple economic models, it is relatively easy to describe how to impose a value-added tax at a uniform rate on all consumption goods, and to demonstrate that this tax is equivalent to a proportional labor-income tax, plus a tax on existing assets. The equivalence involves little more than the national income identity relating the sources and uses of income. Once one attempts to incorporate the costs of financial intermediation, however, tax analysis becomes more complicated. In attempting to determine how a VAT should treat financial transactions, various authors have attempted to apply results from simpler models. Unfortunately, these results can lead to conflicting, ambiguous, and misleading prescriptions. In this paper, we argue that one needs to rely more on the fundamental objectives of a VAT to decide how it should treat financial transactions. Adopting this approach, we find that, in principle, the VAT should apply to resources devoted to financial transactions in the same manner that it does in other sectors. However, as discussed below, there are real problems in implementing such a tax on the financial sector which we do not attempt to address in this paper.

ABSTRACT The double taxation of corporate income should discourage firms from incorporating. We investigate the extent to which the aggregate allocation of assets and taxable income in the United States between corporate and noncorporate firms responds to the size of this tax distortion during the period 1959–1986. In theory, profitable firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax distortion is large, and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our empirical results provide strong support for these forecasts, and imply that the resulting excess burden equals 16 percent of business tax revenue.

The double taxation of corporate income should discourage firms from incorporating. We investigate the extent to which the aggregate allocation of assets and taxable income in the United States between corporate and noncorporate firms responds to the size of this tax distortion during the period 1959–1986. In theory, profitable firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax distortion is large, and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our empirical results provide strong support for these forecasts, and imply that the resulting excess burden equals 16 percent of business tax revenue.