This paper examines how economic policy uncertainty affects financial firms' capital shortages in the event of a new crisis. By employing a global economic policy uncertainty index, we show that an increase in policy uncertainty leads to future capital shortfall increases in the event of a severe market decline. This effect of policy uncertainty is of a similar magnitude for all firms across all regions and sectors, albeit with a few exceptions. As expected, well-capitalized financial firms are less affected. Our findings have important implications for policymakers and politicians, since if their response during a severe market decline is not timely and decisive, the delay will come at a cost. Further, in terms of the implications for firms' managers, we show that during periods of elevated policy uncertainty and a severe market downturn, firms will face additional, unexpected capital requirements.

This paper examines the performance of European banks during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, both in terms of technical and allocative efficiencies. We use an innovative Bayesian dynamic frontier model that: (1) distinguishes between short-run and long-run performance; and (2) provides impulse response functions to examine the dynamic effect of shocks in technical and allocative inefficiencies. Based on a rich sample of European banks, we show that while there was a drop in efficiency for most countries following the crisis, the long-run results suggest improvement both in terms of technical and allocative efficiencies. The impulse response functions also show that in the case of shocks in the system, banks seem to revert back to these long-run allocative efficiency scores. We discuss the results in terms of the current financial crisis and provide interesting implications for the European banking industry. We also discuss the determinants of technical and allocative efficiencies. (We would like to thank Professor Allen N. Berger and Professor Andy Mullineux for their valuable comments on the early version of this paper.)