Analysts are recognized for their expertise in predicting industry growth, yet little is known about whether CEOs learn from analysts’ insights to guide investment decisions. Focusing on conglomerates where CEOs are underinformed about segment growth opportunities, we find that CEOs learn industry insights from analysts to adjust internal capital allocation. The extent of learning increases when analysts have closer proximity to CEOs or expertise in segments where CEOs face larger internal knowledge gaps. CEOs likely learn from analysts through private communications, as the insights learned are not yet publicly available, difficult to replace with other sources, and persistently impactful for firms. CEOs also exploit conference calls as another way to learn from analysts. As a result, learning analysts’ insights enhances firm value. We employ brokerage mergers/closures as a quasi-experiment to address endogeneity concerns. Overall, our study provides novel evidence on a learning channel through which analysts add value to firms.

The rise of stakeholder governance has triggered a wave of legal initiatives to strengthen the employee voice in firms. However, how managers trade off the competing objectives between shareholders and employees when making financial reporting decisions is not well understood. Exploiting staggered employment protection laws (EPLs) across 26 countries, we find that managers facing strong EPLs report more opaque earnings. Exploring the mechanism, we show that EPLs induce manager‐employee alliance: EPLs enhance employees' power to influence managers' private benefits and create an incentive for managers to treat employees more favorably, leading to an increase in manager‐employee reciprocal benefits. Further analysis shows that the alliance drives the increase in opacity following EPLs. Such alliance‐induced opacity impedes the ability of institutional shareholders to make timely adjustments to portfolio holdings in response to EPLs. Last, we identify several governance mechanisms that help break the manager‐employee nexus and restore reporting transparency. Overall, our study documents manager‐employee alliance as a potential cost of rigid labor laws and an important source of managerial reporting bias.

This paper examines the benefits of having an executive or director elected as a fellow of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering (i.e., a star academician). Evidence indicates that markets react positively to news of company executives/directors being elected. We further document that having a fellow spurs innovation, brings additional government subsidy, increases Tobin's q, lowers costs of capital, attracts analyst attention, and suppresses audit fees in the years following successful elections. These outcomes appear to be largely driven by fellows who (i) are executives rather than non-executive directors, and (ii) have held no government office.

Despite regulators’ allegations that digital technology giants misuse their market power to earn abnormal profits, there is a dearth of systematic work on (1) whether digital-tech firms in general, and tech giants in particular, earn excess profits or (2) whether their abnormal profitability, if any, is due to market power. We use two alternative measures of economic profitability in addition to accounting rate of return (ARR): internal rate of return (IRR), which equates current investments to their long-term payback, and return on invested capital (ROIC), whose numerator (profits) and denominator (invested capital) are adjusted for capitalized intangibles. Inferences based on IRRs differ from those based on ARRs and ROICs. IRRs show that the digital-tech sector is now the best-performing sector, and its gap between profitability and cost of capital has increased over time. We are unable to separate the contribution of market power and innovation to digital tech’s high IRRs.