We estimate the causal effect of liquidity regulation on bank balance sheets. We take advantage of the heterogeneous implementation of tighter liquidity regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2010. We find that banks adjusted the composition of both assets and liabilities, increasing the share of high quality liquid assets and non-financial deposits while reducing intra-financial loans and short-term wholesale funding. We do not find evidence that the tightening of liquidity regulation caused banks to shrink their balance sheets, nor reduce the amount of lending to the non-financial sector.

We document capital misallocation in the U.S. investment-grade (IG) corporate bond market, driven by quantitative easing (QE). Prospective fallen angels — risky firms just above the IG cutoff — enjoyed subsidized bond financing in 2009–19. This effect is driven by Fed purchases of securities inducing long-duration IG-focused investors to rebalance their portfolios towards higher-yielding IG bonds. The benefiting firms (i) exploited the sluggish downward adjustment of credit ratings after M&A to finance risky acquisitions with bond issuances, and (ii) increased market share affecting competitors’ employment and investment, but (iii) suffered severe downgrades at the onset of the pandemic.