In this paper we argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside equity investors generates conservatism in financial statements. Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. This increases firm and equity values. Our empirical tests are consistent with our proposition that information asymmetry is significantly positively related to conservatism after controlling for other demands for conservatism. Further, our tests are more consistent with our prediction that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead to changes in conservatism than the FASB's proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among equity investors. An important implication is that, if the FASB was successful in meeting its stated goal of eliminating conservatism, then it would increase information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts.

In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial ownership. The negative association between managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness of earnings is robust to various controls, in particular, for the investment opportunity set. We thus provide evidence of a demand for conservatism from the firm's shareholders.

This paper investigates the effect of internal control deficiencies and their remediation on accrual quality. We first document that firms reporting internal control deficiencies have lower quality accruals as measured by accrual noise and absolute abnormal accruals relative to firms not reporting internal control problems. Second, we find that firms that report internal control deficiencies have significantly larger positive and larger negative abnormal accruals relative to control firms. This finding suggests internal control weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentional errors that add noise to accruals than intentional misstatements that bias earnings upward. Third, we document that firms whose auditors confirm remediation of previously reported internal control deficiencies exhibit an increase in accrual quality relative to firms that do not remediate their control problems. Finally, we find firms that receive different internal control audit opinions in successive years exhibit changes in accrual quality consistent with changes in internal control quality. Collectively, our cross-sectional and intertemporal change tests provide strong evidence that the quality of internal control affects the quality of accruals.