We examine the stock market reaction to announcements of formal supervisory actions. We find that the variation in the quality and timeliness of disclosure by U.S. banks explains much of the variation in the market's reactions. We also find that these announcements can cause spillover effects. However, rather than representing contagion, these spillover effects are consistent with enhanced transparency. Only banks in the same region as the announcing bank, with similar exposures, are affected. Thus, enhanced disclosure can improve the allocation of resources in the banking system. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G28.

Dealers enter nonbinding expressions of interest during the Nasdaq preopening to promote price discovery and ease stock inventory management when the market opens. But does this practice of “indicating ahead” constitute best execution for an individual customer? Arguments in favor of the practice rely on the notion that best execution is a general condition as opposed to a concept applicable on a trade-by-trade basis. Some customers must sacrifice in individual instances to improve the functioning of the overall market. But the practice of indicating ahead violates the dealer agent's duty of loyalty to her individual customer. Moreover, the dealer's financial self-interest is best served by indicating ahead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G18, K22.

Abstract In this article, I use the principal‐agent framework to examine the incentives of risk‐and work‐averse agents to work on projects that are long‐term, multistage, and subject to abandonment. Periodic applications of effort by the agent are required. The agent also obtains private information as the project evolves, and he decides whether the project should be abandoned or continued. The principal not only seeks to provide incentives to induce the agent to take up such risky investments and work hard at them, but also seeks to provide incentives for the agent to abandon the project if the profit prospect is low. We show that the agent's decision to continue is not always aligned with the principal's desire. The result provides an economic rationale for the sunk cost phenomenon. There also exist conditions under which the agent chooses to prematurely abandon the project.

Abstract Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings, Simko, and Thompson (1996) document a negative association between a firm's last‐in, first‐out (LIFO) reserve and the market value of its equity. In this paper, we test a deferred tax explanation of this negative association. Specifically, we argue that investors, conditional on adjusting inventory to as‐if first‐in, first‐out (FIFO), estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden as its LIFO reserve multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate and include this tax‐adjusted LIFO reserve in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net assets. On the basis of this argument, the tax‐adjusted LIFO reserve is in effect an estimate of an off‐balance‐sheet deferred tax liability and, as a result, we predict a negative association between the tax‐adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity. We test our deferred tax explanation by estimating a valuation model in which a firm's market value of equity is expressed as a function of the firm's assets, liabilities, deferred tax liability, and tax‐adjusted LIFO reserve; the model is estimated separately in years preceding and following the reduction of tax rates mandated by the US Tax Reform Act of 1986. Test results provide strong support for the deferred tax explanation of the negative association between a firm's LIFO reserve and the market value of its equity.

Forward rate dynamics are modeled as a random field. In contrast to multifactor models, random field models offer a parsimonious description of term structure dynamics, while eliminating the self-inconsistent practice of recalibration. The form of the drift of the instantaneous forward rate process necessary to preclude arbitrage under the risk-neutral measure is obtained. Forward risk-adjusted measures are identified and used to price a bond option when the forward volatility structure depends on the square root of the current spot rate. Several classes of tractable random field models are presented.

We examine research and development (R&D) agreements between government agencies and other organizations. Consistent with theories of contractual “hold up,” contracts are longer and more complete when the parties envision a joint product as opposed to when they merely plan to share information. Contracts are less complete when the parties have an ongoing business relationship, suggesting an interaction between reputation and explicit contracting. While our experiment cannot dismiss the possibility that these empirical regularities simply reflect the nature of the parties' joint investment, the findings are consistent with arguments that theories of contracting for tangible inputs also pertain to R&D.

International differences in the demand for accounting income predictably affect the way it incorporates economic income (change in market value) over time. We characterize the `shareholder’ and `stakeholder’ corporate governance models of common and code law countries respectively as resolving information asymmetry by public disclosure and private communication. Also, code law directly links accounting income to current payouts (to employees, managers, shareholders and governments). Consequently, code law accounting income is less timely, particularly in incorporating economic losses. Regulation, taxation and litigation cause variation among common law countries. The results have implications for security analysts, standard-setters, regulators, and corporate governance.

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide - the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.

Mounting nuclear plant decommissioning costs and utility deregulation focused attention on accounting for decommissioning liabilities. FASB's Exposure Draft 158-B proposes balance sheet recognition of the projected future decommissioning cost liability at initial plant commission. We expect market valuation of each dollar of decommissioning cost apportioned to utilities to vary with utility-specific factors related to the probability of cost recovery via rates. We find a more negative decommissioning cost/firm value association for utilities with higher business or financial risk. Also, equity value is significantly associated with total decommissioning cost across all nuclear units in which a utility has ownership interest.