This research examines the determinants of the match between high school seniors and postsecondary institutions in the United States. I model college application decisions as a nonsequential search problem and specify a unified structural model of college application, admission, and matriculation decisions that are all functions of unobservable individual heterogeneity. The results indicate that black and Hispanic representation at all 4‐year colleges is predicted to decline modestly—by 2%—if race‐neutral college admissions policies are mandated nationwide. However, race‐neutral admissions are predicted to decrease minority representation at the most selective 4‐year institutions by 10%.

The nature and scope of the Federal Reserve's authority and the structure of its decision making are now “on the table” to an extent that has not been seen since 1935, and the Fed's vaunted independence is under some attack. This essay asks what the Federal Reserve should—and shouldn't—do, leaning heavily on the concept of economies of scope. In particular, I conclude that the central bank should monitor and regulate systemic risk because preserving financial stability is (a) closely aligned with the standard objectives of monetary policy and (b) likely to require lender of last resort powers. I also conclude that the Fed should supervise large financial institutions because that function is so closely to regulating systemic risk. However, several other functions now performed by the Fed could easily be done elsewhere. (JEL E52, E58, G21, G28)

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de l’audit sur le fonctionnement de l’école publique en poursuivant deux objectifs : déterminer si les audits procurent des avantages économiques aux parties prenantes et définir l’incidence de la complexité des règles à observer sur l’efficacité de l’audit. Utilisant des données relatives au temps consacréà l’audit et profitant de l’occasion unique offerte par la Quality Basic Education Act en Georgie, les auteurs estiment le rendement relatif des activités des arrondissements scolaires au moyen d’une méthode stochastique d’estimation des frontières. Ils constatent que l’audit produit de véritables avantages économiques pour les parties prenantes en atténuant le manque d’efficience de l’utilisation des ressources scolaires. Ils constatent également que la rigueur des règles à observer réduit l’efficacité de l’audit mais que l’expérience des auditeurs peut contribuer à surmonter ce problème. Le fait que les coûts d’audit ne soient pas communiqués entrave la réalisation d’une analyse coûts‐avantages des nouvelles exigences. L’analyse des auteurs vient confirmer la thèse selon laquelle l’audit est indispensable à l’établissement de mécanismes de gouvernance et la communication des coûts d’audit est importante dans l’évaluation adéquate d’une nouvelle politique. Les données pertinentes peuvent être obtenues auprès des sources publiques indiquées dans le texte.

We examine the impact of auditing on public school operations with two objectives: to investigate whether audits provide economic benefits to stakeholders and how complex compliance rules impact auditing effectiveness. Utilizing auditing time data and a unique opportunity presented by the Quality Basic Education Act in Georgia, we estimate the relative performance of school district operations employing a stochastic frontier estimation technique. We find that auditing produces real economic benefits for stakeholders by mitigating inefficiency in the use of school resources. We also find that stringent compliance rules reduce an audit’s effectiveness but auditors’ experience can help to overcome the problems. The lack of disclosure of auditing costs hinders the ability to conduct a cost–benefit analysis of new requirements. Our analysis supports the notion that auditing is vital to establish governance mechanisms and disclosure of auditing costs is important to adequately evaluate a new policy. Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.

In this paper, I ask the question: Does the output-mix of countries change in response to changes in factor endowments? If so: How long does it take? Using data on capital, as well as skilled and unskilled labour employed in three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) manufacturing industries for a sample of 27 developing and developed countries over the 1973–1990 period, I find that the output-mix of countries does not change in response to endowment changes, even after 15 years. This answer raises another question: How then do countries absorb changes in factor endowments? The data show that in both the short and long runs, an increase in the supply of a production factor reduces its rate of return and makes it more intensively used in all sectors of the economy: changes in production techniques. In the long run, the point estimate is that the reduction in the rate of return is more than 50% larger than in the short run. This is consistent with induced innovations being predominantly biased towards the scarce factor.

This article documents differences between the Q-sensitivity of investment of stand-alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms. Unrelated segments exhibit lower Q-sensitivity of investment than stand-alone firms. This fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand-alone firms in high-Q industries. This finding is robust to matching on industry, year, size, age, and profitability. The differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes, suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior of conglomerates.

Based on extant literature, we review the positive theory of GAAP. The theory predicts that GAAP’s principal focus is on control (performance measurement and stewardship) and that verifiability and conservatism are critical features of a GAAP shaped by market forces. We recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets, but caution against expanding fair values to financial reporting more generally. We conclude that rather than converging U.S. GAAP with IFRS, competition between the FASB and the IASB would allow GAAP to better respond to market forces.

In this paper, we study how risk-shifting incentives and the design of debt covenants are affected by the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU) in the underlying technology of the firm. We show that the extent of risk-shifting as well as the yield demanded on corporate debt are larger the later the resolution of uncertainty (thus providing one explanation for the empirical evidence of Reisz and Perlich (2006)). We allow for contracting based on verifiable information disclosed by the manager. In this context, we characterize optimal covenants restricting investment. The effects of these covenants on the firm's investment policy and corporate bond yields under different disclosure policies and patterns of TRU are studied. Empirical implications are derived and discussed.