Military assignment mechanisms provide a unique opportunity to estimate the impact of high-performing mentors on job advancement of their subordinates. Combining US Army administrative data with officer evaluation reports, we find that high-performing mentors positively affect early junior officer promotion and that early promotion probabilities rise as the duration of the high-quality mentorship increases. These effects are largest for high-ability protégés. Junior officers who were exposed to multiple high-performing mentors did not experience an additional increase in promotion rates.

Abstract We show that lenders make price concessions for the right to resell loans and reveal a strong countervailing association between the ex ante probability of loan resale and the initial loan spreads. We disentangle the side effects (reduced monitoring) from the benefits (enhanced liquidity) brought by the secondary loan resales. The average net impact of simultaneously reducing the probability of the presence of resale constraint and raising the probability of resale across the full sample is to lower spreads by 14 basis points. On balance, the secondary loan market provides clear benefits to the issuers of debt.

This paper examines the impact of a defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze on the sponsoring firm's risk and risk-taking activities. Using a sample of firms declaring a hard freeze on their DB plans between 2002 and 2007, we observe an increase in total risk (proxied by the standard deviation of EBITDA and asset beta), equity risk (standard deviation of returns), and credit risk following a DB-plan freeze. The increase in credit risk is reflected in a decline in credit ratings and an increase in bond yields for freezing firms. When we examine investment strategies, we observe a shift in investment from capital expenditures before the freeze to more-risky R&D projects after the freeze, and an increase in leverage. These strategies (increased focus on R&D and higher leverage) increase the operating and financial risk the firm faces. Overall, we observe an increase in risk-taking following DB plan freezes, consistent with theories that DB plans act as “inside debt” that aligns managers’ interests with bondholders’.

We exploit a 2004 credit reform in Brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans. We show that the reform expanded credit to riskier, self-employed borrowers who purchased newer, more expensive cars. The legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities. Although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers' access to credit, it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default. Our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit.

We examine investors’ reactions to announcements of large capital infusions by U.S. financial institutions (FIs) from 2000 to 2009. These infusions include private market infusions (seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)) as well as injections of government capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The sample period covers both business cycle expansions and contractions, and the recent financial crisis. We present evidence on the factors affecting FIs’ decisions to raise capital, the determinants of investor reactions, and post-infusion risk-taking of the recipients, as well as a sample of matching FIs. Investors reacted negatively to the news of private market SEOs by FIs, both in the immediate term (e.g., the two days surrounding the announcement) and over the subsequent year, but positively to TARP injections. Reactions differed depending on the characteristics of the FIs, and the stage of the business cycle. Smaller, more financially constrained non-bank institutions were more likely to have raised capital through private market offerings during the period prior to TARP, and firms receiving a TARP injection tended to be riskier and more levered. In the case of TARP recipients, they appeared to finance an increase in credit risk with more stable financing sources such as core deposits, which lowered their liquidity risk. However, we find no evidence that banks’ capital adequacy increased after the capital injections.

This paper empirically examines how CEO optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises. The main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller (in absolute value) earnings surprises. A possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the “torpedo effect,” the innate behavior of optimists, and the risk of litigation/prosecution for over-reporting earnings.