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Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

Review of Economic Studies 2002 69(2), 407-436
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases.

Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion

Journal of Finance 2007 62(5), 2275-2302
We study the propagation of financial crises among regions in which banks are protected by limited liability and may take excessive risk. The regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks, so liquidity coinsurance is Pareto improving. The moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized. Under autarky a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk‐taking, but when financial markets are open capital becomes insufficient. Thus, bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crisis spreads to other regions via financial linkages. Opening financial markets is nevertheless Pareto improving; consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance, although they pay the cost of excessive risk‐taking.