Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.

We examine the relation between cross-sectional earnings dispersion and the banking sector's performance. Theory suggests that cross-sectional earnings dispersion will lead to greater loan losses and higher interest rates. We confirm this hypothesis by showing a robust association between earnings dispersion and bank performance. Dispersion in earnings explains more of the overall bank performance than macroeconomic indicators for business cycles. We also find that banks tighten their lending standards and increase interest rates to partially compensate for future loan losses. Finally, we find that cross-sectional earnings dispersion is associated with dispersion in bank performance. The relation between dispersion in bank performance and earnings dispersion is declining over time suggesting that systematic risk is rising in the banking sector.