This article shows that postcrisis stress tests have negative effects on entrepreneurship and innovation at young firms. Exploiting unique data on business-related home equity loans in Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, I show that stress-tested banks strongly cut small business loans secured by home equity, an important source of financing for entrepreneurs. Lower credit supply leads to a relative decline in entrepreneurship in counties with higher exposure to stress-tested banks. The decline is stronger in sectors with a higher share of young firms using home equity financing, that is, in which the reduction in credit hits hardest. More-exposed counties also see a decline in young firms’ patent applications as well as labor productivity, reflecting young firms’ disproportionate contribution to growth.

We classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. We show that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. Positive loan supply effects lead to higher firm investment and employment growth. Diversified banks are stabilizing due to their ability to raise additional funding during times of distress. Distinguishing banks by nationality reveals that diversified domestic banks are a stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are fickle. Findings suggest that declining financial integration makes countries more vulnerable to local financial shocks.

This paper shows that high market concentration in the U.S. manufactured home loan market allows lenders to charge markedly higher interest rates than in the mortgage market for site-built homes. Borrowers in counties with higher lender concentration face significantly higher rates, and evidence from bunching at a regulatory rate threshold, an instrumental variable analysis, and a difference-in-differences analysis suggests a causal link. Integrated lenders, which play an outsized role in this market, charge particularly high rates, and we provide evidence suggesting that these lenders exploit their market power over borrowers. We discuss factors that may explain limited lender entry.

Do financial crises radicalize voters? We study Germany's 1931 banking crisis, collecting new data on bank branches and firm‐bank connections. Exploiting cross‐sectional variation in precrisis exposure to the bank at the center of the crisis, we show that Nazi votes surged in locations more affected by its failure. Radicalization in response to the shock was exacerbated in cities with a history of anti‐Semitism. After the Nazis seized power, both pogroms and deportations were more frequent in places affected by the banking crisis. Our results suggest an important synergy between financial distress and cultural predispositions, with far‐reaching consequences.