The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model provides a rigorous framework for summarizing the information in expected future earnings and book values. However, the model provides little guidance on selecting an empirical proxy for expected future earnings. We examine whether and under what circumstances historical earnings and analyst earnings forecasts offer comparable explanation of security prices. This issue is of particular interest because analyst forecasts are less readily available than historical data. Under appropriate circumstances, historical data may allow wider use of the Feltham‐Ohlson valuation model by researchers and investors. A related issue is the incremental explanatory power of historical earnings and realized future earnings (perfect‐foresight forecasts) for security prices beyond analyst forecasts. If historical earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect price‐relevant information in past earnings. If future earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that security prices reflect investors' implicit earnings forecasts beyond analyst forecasts. We examine these issues using a historical model (based on past earnings), a perfect‐foresight model (based on realized future earnings), and a forecast model (based on Value Line earnings forecasts). All three models provide significant explanatory power for security prices, and each set of earnings data provides incremental explanatory power for prices when used with the other sets of earnings data. We estimate the models separately for firms with moderate and extreme earnings‐to‐price (E/P) ratios, a proxy for earnings permanence. For moderate‐E/P firms, the historical model's explanatory power exceeds that of the perfect foresight model, and is indistinguishable from that of the analyst forecast model. In contrast, for extreme‐E/P firms, the perfect‐foresight model offers greater explanatory power than the historical model, but lower explanatory power than analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that financial analysts' forecasting efforts are best focused on firms whose earnings contain large temporary components (extreme E/P firms). However, in general, both historical data and analyst forecasts are complementary information sources for security valuation.

Previous empirical research on the informativeness of earnings has focused on stockholders, and has not examined differences in earnings' informativeness for stockholders and bondholders. Because stockholders are residual claimants and bondholders are fixed claimants, the informativeness of earnings should differ for these two types of investors. When a firm's default risk is low, changes in its financial condition should be of limited relevance to bondholders, but should be relevant to stockholders. In contrast, as the likelihood of financial distress increases, stockholders' limited liability allows them to abandon the firm to the bondholders (Fischer and Verrecchia 1997). Accordingly, as a firm's default risk increases, changes in its financial condition should be increasingly important to bondholders and less important to shareholders. Because earnings provide information on firm value, the stock return‐earnings association should decrease as the firm's financial strength declines, while the bond return‐earnings association should increase. We use two measures of a firm's financial strength: the firm's bond rating and its reporting of a loss. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the association between stock returns and changes in annual earnings decreases as bond ratings decline, while the association between bond returns and changes in annual earnings increases. These results suggest that as the company's financial condition deteriorates, earnings become less relevant for stock valuation and more relevant for bond valuation. When we partition firms based on their loss status, we find a stronger association between stock returns and annual earnings changes for firms with positive earnings (profit firms) than for firms with losses, consistent with earlier studies. In contrast, we find that the association between bond returns and earnings changes is greater for loss firms than for profit firms. These results suggest that losses reduce the informativeness of earnings for stockholders but increase informativeness for bondholders, suggesting that investors view losses as indicating increased credit risk.

Unexpected earnings, Market reaction, Nonlinear price response

Prior research suggests that investors' response to analyst forecast revisions increases with the analyst's forecast accuracy. We extend this research by examining whether investors appear to extract all of the information that analyst characteristics provide about forecast accuracy. We find that only some of the analyst characteristics that are associated with future forecast accuracy are also associated with return responses to forecast revisions. This suggests that investors fail to extract some of the information that analyst characteristics can provide about future forecast accuracy. In addition, forecast properties other than expected accuracy appear to be value-relevant. For example, investors respond more strongly to forecasts released earlier in the year and to forecasts by analysts employed by large brokerages than appears warranted by the ability of forecast timeliness and broker size to predict forecast accuracy. We conclude that investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if forecast accuracy is not all that matters.

This study classifies analysts' earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that (1) boldness likelihood increases with the analyst's prior accuracy, brokerage size, and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows, consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability; (2) bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts; and (3) herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts' earnings forecast errors (actual earnings—forecast) than are bold forecast revisions. Thus, bold forecasts incorporate analysts' private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts.

Firms incur restructuring charges as a result of actions intended to improve their operating performance. However, there is little evidence on whether restructuring charges are associated with improved performance. We examine a sample of firms reporting restructuring in 1991‐93 and find that the restructuring firms' earnings increase over the levels immediately before restructuring. Compared with a control sample of firms that report no restructuring, the restructuring firms improve their earnings and operating income, but evidence for improvements in cash flow from operations is mixed. In regression analysis, we find that restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the restructuring year, but this association is largely driven by firms with multiple restructurings and firms reporting losses in the restructuring year. We find no association between restructuring charges and post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the year before restructuring. Restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in operating income and cash flow from operations for firms with multiple restructurings. In summary, restructuring charges are associated with improved earnings, but our results suggest that restructuring in the early 1990s did not necessarily guarantee improved operating performance.