Televised debates between presidential candidates are often regarded as the exemplar of persuasive communication. Yet, recent evidence from Le Pennec and Pons (2023) indicates that they may not sway voters as strongly as popular belief suggests. We revisit their findings through the lens of the persuasion rate and introduce a robust framework that does not require exogenous treatment, parallel trends, or credible instruments. Instead, we leverage plausible monotonicity assumptions to partially identify the persuasion rate and related parameters. Our results reaffirm that the sharp upper bounds on the persuasive effects of TV debates remain modest.

This paper examines a commonly used measure of persuasion whose precise interpretation has been obscure in the literature. By using the potential outcome framework, we define the causal persuasion rate by a proper conditional probability of taking the action of interest with a persuasive message conditional on not taking the action without the message. We then formally study identification under empirically relevant data scenarios and show that the commonly adopted measure generally does not estimate—but often overstates—the causal rate of persuasion. We discuss several new parameters of interest and provide practical methods for causal inference.

Multivalued treatment models have typically been studied under restrictive assumptions: ordered choice, and more recently, unordered monotonicity. We show how treatment effects can be identified in a more general class of models that allows for multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity. Our results rely on two main assumptions: treatment assignment must be a measurable function of threshold‐crossing rules, and enough continuous instruments must be available. We illustrate our approach for several classes of models.

This paper presents new evidence that increases in college enrollment lead to a decline in the average quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000, resulting in a decrease of 6 percentage points in the college premium. A standard demand and supply framework can qualitatively account for the trend in the college and age premia over this period, but substantial quantitative adjustments are needed to account for changes in quality.

Many economic panel and dynamic models, such as rational behavior and Euler equations, imply that the parameters of interest are identified by conditional moment restrictions. We introduce a novel inference method without any prior information about which conditioning instruments are weak or irrelevant. Building on Bierens (1990), we propose penalized maximum statistics and combine bootstrap inference with model selection. Our method optimizes asymptotic power by solving a data-dependent max-min problem for tuning parameter selection. Extensive Monte Carlo experiments, based on an empirical example, demonstrate the extent to which our inference procedure is superior to those available in the literature. [C12, C36].