Using data on identical and fraternal twins’ complete financial portfolios, we decompose the cross-sectional variation in investor behavior. We find that a genetic factor explains about one-third of the variance in stock market participation and asset allocation. Family environment has an effect on the behavior of young individuals, but this effect is not long-lasting and disappears as an individual gains experience. Frequent contact among twins results in similar investment behavior beyond a genetic factor. Twins who grew up in different environments still display similar investment behavior. Our interpretation of a genetic component of the decision to invest in the stock market is that there are innate differences in factors affecting effective stock market participation costs. We attribute the genetic component of asset allocation—the relative amount invested in equities and the portfolio volatility—to genetic variation in risk preferences.

A stock’s market exposure, beta, varies across return frequencies. Sorting stocks on the difference between low- and high-frequency betas (Δβ) yields large systematic mispricings relative to the CAPM at high frequencies, but significantly smaller mispricings at low frequencies. We provide a risk-based explanation for this frequency dependence by introducing uncertainty about the effect of systematic news on firm value (opacity) into a frictionless model. We document a robust relationship between the frequency dependence of betas and proxies for opacity. Our findings suggest that opacity poses significant challenges to using betas estimated from high-frequency returns. While the CAPM may be an appropriate asset pricing model at low frequencies, additional factors, e.g., based on opacity, are necessary at high frequencies.

We examine the formation and evolution of corporate risk culture, that is, the preferences toward risk and uncertainty shared by a firm’s leaders, as well as its effect on corporate policies. We document persistent commonality in risk attitudes inside firms, which arises through the selection of leaders with similar preferences and is rooted in the founders’ risk attitudes. Changes in corporate risk culture over time affect corporate investment policies, whereas cross-sectional differences in founders’ risk attitudes, that is, firms’ initial risk culture, contribute to differences across firms in persistent firm policies, such as research and development intensity.

We examine the effect of personal, two‐way communication on the payment behavior of delinquent borrowers. Borrowers who speak with a randomly assigned bank agent are significantly more likely to successfully resolve the delinquency relative to borrowers who do not speak with a bank agent. Call characteristics related to the human touch of the call, such as the likeability of the agent's voice, significantly affect payment behavior. Borrowers who speak with a bank agent are also significantly less likely to become delinquent again. Our findings highlight the value of a human element in interactions between financial institutions and their customers.

We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs’ attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, uncertainty-averse CEOs prefer targets in familiar industries and targets that can be more easily integrated. The emphasis on cultural identity by CEOs’ parents and the ethnic composition of CEOs’ early life environment significantly influence the cultural transmission process. Cultural differences about uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time.

Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions. We address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, we find that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded. Moreover, borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed have better credit scores and default less often. Overall, our findings suggest that impressions of trustworthiness matter in financial transactions as they predict investor, as well as borrower, behavior. A man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom. –John Pierpont Morgan, 1913

We find that differences in individuals' prenatal environments explain heterogeneity in financial decisions later in life. An exogenous increase in exposure to prenatal testosterone is associated with the masculinization of financial behavior, specifically with elevated risk taking and trading in adulthood. We also examine birth weight. Those with higher birth weight are more likely to participate in the stock market, whereas those with lower birth weight tend to prefer portfolios with higher volatility and skewness, consistent with compensatory behavior. Our results contribute to the understanding of how the prenatal environment shapes an individual's behavior in financial markets later in life.

Measuring the impact of political risk on investment projects is one of the most vexing issues in international business. One popular approach is to assume that the sovereign yield spread captures political risk and to augment the project discount rate by this spread. We show that this approach is flawed. While the sovereign spread is influenced by political risk, it also reflects other risks that are likely included in the valuation analysis — leading to the double counting of risks. We propose to use “political risk spreads” to undo the double counting in the evaluation of international investment projects.

We use industry valuation differentials across European countries to study the impact of membership in the European Union as well as the Eurozone on both economic and financial integration. In integrated markets, discount rates and expected growth opportunities should be similar within one industry, irrespective of the country, implying narrowing valuation differentials as countries become more integrated. Our analysis of the 1990–2007 period shows that membership in the EU significantly lowered discount rate and expected earnings growth differentials across countries. In contrast, the adoption of the Euro was not associated with increased integration. Our results do not change when the sample is extended to include the recent crisis period.

We propose a new, valuation-based measure of world equity market segmentation. While we observe decreased levels of segmentation in many countries, the level of segmentation remains significant in emerging markets. We characterize the factors that account for variation in market segmentation both through time as well as across countries. Both a country's regulation with respect to foreign capital flows and certain nonregulatory factors are important. In particular, we identify a country's political risk profile and its stock market development as two additional local segmentation factors as well as the U.S. corporate credit spread as a global segmentation factor.