This paper examines the effect of inflation on stock valuations and expected long-run returns. Ex ante estimates of expected long-run returns are constructed by incorporating analysts' earnings forecasts into a variant of the Campbell-Shiller dividend-price ratio model. The negative relation between equity valuations and expected inflation is found to be the result of two effects: a rise in expected inflation coincides with both lower expected real earnings growth and higher required real returns. The earnings channel mostly reflects a negative relation between expected long-term earnings growth and expected inflation. The effect of expected inflation on required (long-run) real stock returns is also substantial. An increase of one percentage point in expected inflation is estimated to raise required real stock returns about one percentage point, which on average would imply a 20% decline in stock prices. But the inflation factor in expected real stock returns is also in long-term Treasury yields; consequently, expected inflation has little effect on the long-run equity premium.

Customer relationships arise between banks and firms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers; competition thus drives banks to lend to new firms at interest rates which initially generate expected losses. As a result, the allocation of capital is shifted toward lower quality and inexperienced firms. This inefficiency is eliminated if complete contingent contracts are written or, when this is costly, if banks can make nonbinding commitments that, in equilibrium, are backed by reputation.

Previous empirical studies on the “rationality” of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors but provide only limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. This paper tests for a specific form of forecast bias. In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Such a bias would be consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) or could arise from professional forecasters’ strategic incentives. We find broad-based and significant evidence for this form of bias, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. To investigate whether market participants’ expectations are influenced by this bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the forecast error and not to the component induced by anchoring, suggesting that expectations of market participants anticipate this bias embedded in expert forecasts.

This paper evaluates the influence of financial contracting costs on public corporations' incentives to lease fixed capital. We argue that firms facing high costs of external funds can economize on the cost of funding by leasing. We construct several measures of leasing propensity, plus some a priori indicators of the severity of financial constraints facing firms. We find that the share of total annual fixed capital costs attributable to either capital or operating leases is substantially higher at lower-rated, non-dividend-paying, cash-poor firms — those likely to face relatively high premiums for external funds.

A simple overlapping generations model is used to characterize the effects of initial margin requirements on the volatility of risky asset prices. Investors are assumed to exhibit heterogeneous preferences for risk‐bearing, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. This framework is used to show that imposing a binding initial margin requirement may either increase or decrease stock price volatility, depending upon the microeconomic structure behind fluctuations in economy‐wide average risk‐bearing propensity. The ambiguous effect on volatility similarly arises when the source of heterogeneity is noise trader beliefs.

A simple overlapping generations model is used to characterize the effects of initial margin requirements on the volatility of risky asset prices. Investors are assumed to exhibit heterogeneous preferences for risk-bearing, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. This framework is used to show that imposing a binding initial margin requirement may either increase or decrease stock price volatility, depending upon the microeconomic structure behind fluctuations in economy-wide average risk-bearing propensity. The ambiguous effect on volatility similarly arises when the source of heterogeneity is noise trader beliefs. BEYOND THEIR PRUDENTIAL FUNCTIONS, the effects of initial margin requirements on securities markets are not well understood. Many have argued, based upon empirical findings, that the level of margin requirements has no discernable impact on stock price behavior.' Nevertheless, the view that high margin requirements dampen speculative excesses and reduce excess price volatility remains popular. The simultaneous existence of such views highlights the uncertainty surrounding this issue. In fact, there exists no rigorously articulated theory of the interaction between initial margin requirements and stock prices and their returns' characteristics. In this paper we construct a simple dynamic model useful for characterizing the effects of initial margin requirements on security prices and returns. To analyze the impact of margins, we introduce investor heterogeneity into an otherwise simplified overlapping generations (OLG) economy.2 The OLG models are constructed so that each generation displays heterogeneous preferences or beliefs, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. In each of two heterogeneous taste models we consider there are two types of agents, one of which is more risk tolerant than the other. In one model, the