A number of studies have tested for information content in the ASR 190 disclosure by comparing the conditional and unconditional distribution of abnormal security returns around the time of disclosure. Since no differences were observed, it was concluded that ASR 190 had no information content. The study reported below performs a similar test by estimating the regression function of the conditional distribution of abnormal returns. This test procedure controls for the information content in contemporaneous historical cost disclosure and uses a conditioning variable not considered in earlier tests. It finds statistically significant stock price effects. However, because most of the effects appear to precede the official announcement date by several months, it is unclear whether stock prices were responding to the leakage of the information content of ASR 190 prior to disclosure, to private production of information contained in ASR 190 or to a variable omitted from the study which happens to be correlated with replacement costs.

Abstract We investigate the extent to which auditors of U.S. companies reduce fees on initial audit engagements (“fee discounting”). We hypothesize that rivalries among sellers, in terms of client turnover and price competition, are more intense among small audit firms. The data support this hypothesis. New clients account for 34 percent of all clients for small audit firms, but only 9 percent of all clients for large audit firms. We theorize that differences in client turnover rates between large and small audit firms can be explained by the market structure of the audit industry, which consists of an oligopolistic segment dominated by a few large audit firms and an atomistic segment composed of many small audit firms. We further hypothesize and confirm that fee discounting is more extensive in the atomistic sector, and our results confirm this hypothesis. Our analysis of audit fee changes indicates that clients who switch auditors within the atomistic sector receive on average a discount of 24 percent over the prior auditor's fee. However, clients who switch auditors within the oligopolistic sector receive on average a discount of only 4 percent. Given that price competition is known to be less intense in oligopolistic markets than in atomistic markets, we believe that market structure theory can explain why fee discounting is lower when larger audit firms compete for clients.

This article hypothesizes that resources employed in concentrated industries are more specialized and durable and therefore less mobile than resources employed in atomistic industries. The hypothesis is tested by estimating the relationship between changes in the market value of a firm's securities and changes in its earnings levels and comparing this relation under different market structures. The response of market values to earnings changes is found to be greater for concentrated industries than for atomistic industries. This difference is interpreted as evidence that abnormal earnings persist longer in concentrated industries because of the lower degree of resource mobility.

Income measurement, Historical cost earnings, ASR No. 190, SFAS No. 33