In a recent article in this journal [6], Clement G. Krouse and Wayne Y. Lee (hereafter K-L) presented a model of optimal equity financing of a corporation based on Pontryagin's maximum principle. In this note the basic assumption of a constant internal rate of return of the K-L model is relaxed. As a result, the financial implications of the K-L results remain essentially unchanged, but their applicability is extended considerably, and some undesirable solution characteristics are eliminated.

Three important methods exist for the treatment of risk in capital budgeting problems: the certainty equivalent method (CE), the risk-adjusted discount method (RAD), and the probability distribution or Hillier-Hertz approach (PD, based on [4]). Each one of these methods evaluates the multiperiod stream of risky returns generated by an investment for given distributions of the returns in each period. A common assumption for all three methods is the certainty of the occurrence of a given risky cash inflow (defined by its distribution) in a given time period. This assumption is probably derived from accounting practices. In references [8] and [9] the PD approach was generalized by removing the certain timing assumption. This paper examines the implications of random timing of cash returns within the framework of the better known CE method.

This paper examines the decision to enter into a sector dominated by a monopoly if demand is random at entry time. Given a two-period world, the monopolist enters initially and enjoys an uncontested monopoly for one period, while the entrant may enter and compete during the second period. Demand is random one period earlier and independently distributed in both periods and entry corresponds to an irreversible capacity choice, made under certain demand. All other production decisions take place after demand has been revealed. Risk-neutrality is assumed on both sides. If entry occurs then there is a Cournot duopoly in the second period. It is shown that concurrently with this Cournot production game, there is a separate Stackelberg-type game with capacities as decision variables. Entry-deterrence conditions are derived under general demand and cost assumptions. It is shown that demand uncertainty changes several of the results of similar certain demand models.

In a series of recent articles ([2], [3], [4], [5]) R. B. Porter and his associates have conducted empirical comparisons of the Mean-Variance (EV) and Stochastic Dominance portfolio choice criteria. The basic methodology of all these studies was first to compute the set of EV-efficient portfolios by an optimizing algorithm, then to find through heuristic methods “stochastically dominant” portfolios, and finally to compare the two. A major finding of these studies was that most EV-efficient portfolios survived the second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) test against the randomly generated portfolios. The purpose of this note is to show that, for all cases of practical interest, a portion of the EV frontier is a subset of the SSD-efficient set. In other words, we offer here an exact theoretical justification of some empirical results of the aforementioned studies.

This paper applies a game theory approach to examine the effects of a market structure change in options trading from a monopoly to a Cournot-type oligopoly that occurred in two successive periods on the Montreal exchange. We analyze the intra-day behaviour of option bid-ask spreads and find that cross-listing has a differential impact on spreads, affecting quoted but not effective spreads under oligopoly. We also find that the impact of the change in structure on effective spreads comes mostly from an increase in limit orders and is consistent with a switch from Cournot to Bertrand-type strategic behaviour for such orders. We conclude that market structure effects within an options exchange are enough to realize most of the benefits of inter-market competition even in the context of market thinness.

We generalize the asset dynamics assumptions of Leland (1994b) and Leland and Toft (1996) to a state dependent variance with constant elasticity process (CEV) and obtain analytical solutions for corporate debt and equity value. We use the GMM technique to extract the parameters by fitting the empirical data in the equity and credit default swap markets simultaneously. We find that the elasticity parameter is significantly different from zero for most of the firms and that the CEV model performs much better than the model with constant volatility in both in-sample fittings and out-of-sample predictions of CDS spreads.

We present a new approach to the pricing of catastrophe event (CAT) derivatives that does not assume a fully diversifiable event risk. Instead, we assume that the event occurrence and intensity affect the return of the market portfolio of an agent that trades in the event derivatives. Based on this approach, we derive values for a CAT option and a reinsurance contract on an insurer’s assets using recent results from the option pricing literature. We show that the assumption of unsystematic event risk seriously underprices the CAT option. Last, we present numerical results for our derivatives using real data from hurricane landings in Florida.

ABSTRACT Upper and lower bounds are derived for call options traded at discrete intervals. These bounds are independent of assumptions on the stock price distribution other than a restriction satisfied by the stock being “non‐negative beta.” The development of the bounds relies on the single‐price law and arbitrage arguments. Both single‐period and multiperiod results are produced, and put option bounds follow by extension. The bounds exist as equilibrium values given a consensus on stock price distribution; they are also valid for empirical studies, being adjustable for dividends and commissions.