In this article I examine the response of investors and analysts of nonannouncing firms to the earnings report of the first announcers in the industry. The error in the earnings forecast of the first announcer is found to be informative about the errors in the contemporaneous earnings forecasts of subsequent announcers in the industry. However, investors and analysts do not appear to fully incorporate the information from the first announcers’ news in their revised earnings expectations for subsequent announcers. This apparent underreaction to the first announcers’ news leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the days following the first announcement. Results of this study can be seen as further evidence of investor and analyst underreaction to publicly available information.

An emerging literature looking at self-selected, corporate news events concludes that markets appear to underreact to news. Recent theoretical articles have explored why or how underreaction might occur. However, the notion of underreaction is contentious. We revisit this issue by focusing on one of the most simple of corporate transactions, the stock split. Prior studies that report abnormal return drifts subsequent to splits do not appear to be spurious, nor a consequence of misspecified benchmarks. Using recent cases, we report a drift of 9% in the year following a split announcement. We consider fundamental operating performance as a source of the underreaction and find that splitting firms have an unusually low propensity to experience a contraction in future earnings. Further, analysts’ earnings forecasts are comparatively low at the time of the split announcement and revise sluggishly over time. Together these results are consistent with the notion of market underreaction to the information in corporate news events.

We study the determinants and market impact of sell-side debt research. Analyzing a sample of 5920 debt reports published by 15 brokerage firms from 1999 to 2004, we document that companies with a higher probability of financial distress, lower market-to-book ratio, larger debt, and higher leverage receive more debt research. In addition, we document higher frequency of debt reports around credit ratings downgrades and find that their publication impacts equity prices. The evidence enhances our understanding of the nature of the market forces shaping sell-side debt research and its effect on price formation.

ABSTRACT Prior research documents mean reversion in firm profitability and growth under the implicit assumption that profitability and growth of all firms revert to a common benchmark at the same rate. However, a large body of academic research suggests that there are systematic interindustry differences (e.g., industry barriers to entry) that differentially affect firm performance based on industry membership. We evaluate the relative forecast accuracy of mean reverting models at the industry and economywide levels and find that industry‐specific models are generally more accurate in predicting firm growth but not profitability.

Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods so that each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one or two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added every fifth or sixth year and, consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of predictable forecast errors and stock returns in 14-week quarters, suggesting that analysts and investors do not, on average, adjust their expectations for the extra week. The ease with which 14-week quarters can be predicted, and expectations adjusted, suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of analysts and investors.