This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings–return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Second, concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership concentration prevents leakage of proprietary information about the firms’ rent-seeking activities.

Earnings Patterns, IPO, China, Financial packaging

An auditor's reputation lends credibility to the earnings report that he audits. An unresolved issue is whether auditor size is correlated with auditor quality, where a high-quality auditor is defined as one who brings about more credible earnings reports. According to basic intuition and a modified Holthausen-Verrecchia (1988) model, investors' response to an earnings surprise will depend on the perceived credibility of the earnings report. In this study, we examine whether the earnings response coefficient (ERC) differs between Big Eight (B8) and non-Big Eight (NB8) audited firms. This provides a test of the joint hypotheses that auditor size is a proxy for auditor credibility and of the modified H-V model. Consistent with the joint hypotheses, we find that the ERCs of Big Eight clients are statistically significantly higher than for non-Big Eight clients. The result obtains in both a matched sample of firms paired according to industry membership, and a switch sample of firms grouped according to shifts from and to B8 and NB8 auditors. Furthermore, the result is robust with respect to the inclusion of other explanatory factors for ERG that have been suggested by previous studies: growth and persistence, risk, firm size, and predisclosure information environment.

We find that analysts’ forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term underperformance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts’ credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency.

Using a sample of 231 firms in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, we examine the changes in firms' accounting practice around leadership successions-the turnovers of chairmen. We find that the successions are associated with reduction in the firms' unsigned discretionary accruals and an increase in timely loss recognition. We argue that the incumbent chairmen cannot transfer most of their unique assets, such as reputation and political/social networks, to their successors, resulting in reduced relationship-based contracting post succession. This change from relationship-based to market-based contracting also shifts the firms to a less insider-based accounting system. Moreover, we find that the extent of the shift in accounting is larger in founder successions ( turnovers of chairmen that are founders) than in subsequent ( non-founder) successions, possibly because the loss of unique assets is more pronounced in the first succession than in subsequent successions.

This paper finds that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned enterprises controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors). In regions with less developed institutions, SOEs controlled by central government (central SOEs) also have such a tendency. However, the tendency of local and central SOEs to hire small local auditors is attenuated as the institutions develop. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for large or non-local auditors, small local auditors’ superior local knowledge, and SOEs’ collusion incentives.

In an attempt to increase credibility in its capital markets, China recently adopted new auditing standards. Consistent with increased auditor independence, we find that the frequency of modified opinions increases nine-fold subsequent to the adoption of the new standards. However, the increase in modified reports is followed by a decline in audit market share among large auditors – those with the greatest propensity to issue modified reports. We conjecture that this `flight from audit quality’ results from lack of incentives to demand independent auditors. Our findings suggest that government regulation alone is insufficient to create financial markets that foster auditor independence.