Amir and Lev (1996) address two interesting issues: the value-relevance of reported financial information for fast-changing, science-based companies and the value-relevance of nonfinancial information incremental to financial information. Using a sample of cellular phone companies, they report that the financial accounting information is only value-relevant after the inclusion of the nonfinancial information and that the nonfinancial information they examine is value-relevant both by itself and incremental to the financial information. I first discuss details specific to the tests conducted by Amir and Lev before discussing some of the implications offered by Amir and Lev.

Presents a reply to the clarification made by Joseph K. Cheung and Mandy Li on the author's interpretation of the component of the call option held by the research and development (R&D) firm with R&D limited partnerships. Difference between their measurements and computations.

Research and development limited partnerships are a relatively recent alternative to the more traditional debt and equity funding of research and development costs. This paper provides an economic and empirical analysis of the factors that may motivate firms to select limited partnerships as a source of funding. The analysis uses a framework that relies on extant capital structure models and agency theory to derive empirically testable hypotheses. Results of the empirical tests are consistent with both a tax motivation and, to a lesser extent, an off-balance-sheet motivation for firms to use a limited partnership to fund their research and development costs. More generally, the analysis and results offer support for the clientele tax models of Miller [1977] and DeAngelo and Masulis [1980], and the analysis of taxes by Scholes and Wolfson [1984] and Maid and Myers [1985]. The off-balance-sheet results offer some support for agency model predictions.

Several studies have documented a significant association between firm size and cumulative abnormal returns surrounding quarterly earnings announcements, after controlling for unexpected earnings. The sign of the association depends on the sign of unexpected earnings. Specifically, in a regression of cumulative abnormal returns on unexpected earnings and firm size, the coefficient on firm size is negative for observations with positive unexpected earnings and is positive for observations with negative unexpected earnings. These results hold after adjusting returns for the firm size return effect. In the absence of an economic rationale for firm size per se to be priced in this manner, we draw on extant capital market literature to identify two potential explanations for the signed‐size effect. Each suggests that firm size may be proxying for some misspecification of the relation between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings: measurement error in the researcher's proxy for unexpected earnings and constrained estimation of earnings response coefficients. The signed‐size effect remains after incorporating numerous procedures to mitigate the influence of each of these misspecifications. We develop implications of ignoring the anomalous signed‐size effect for studies investigating the association between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings. Studies affected are those that omit firm size (the estimated earnings response coefficient is biased upward), include firm size as a linear additive variable (the estimated coefficient on firm size is generally not interpretable), and include other variables correlated with firm size (their estimated coefficients are generally biased). Résumé. Plusieurs chercheurs ont démontré l'existence d'une relation significative entre la taille de l'entreprise et les rendements anormaux cumulatifs entourant les annonces de bénéfices trimestriels, compte tenu du contrôle des bénéfices inattendus. Le signe de cette relation (positif ou négatif) dépend de celui des bénéfices inattendus. En termes précis, dans une régression des rendements anormaux cumulatifs par rapport aux bénéfices inattendus à de la taille de l'entreprise, le coefficient relatif à la taille de l'entreprise est négatif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus positifs, alors qu'il est positif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus négatifs. Ces résultats persistent une fois les rendements ajustés pour tenir compte de l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise. Faute de fondements économiques sur lesquels appuyer ce genre d'évaluation en fonction de la taille de l'entreprise en tant que telle, les auteurs ont puisé dans les écrits existants relatifs au marché des capitaux deux explications possibles de l'incidence positive ou négative de la taille: l'erreur de mesure de la variable substitutive des bénéfices inattendus utilisée par le chercheur et l'estimation restreinte des coefficients de réaction aux bénéfices. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, il semble que la taille de l'entreprise puisse servir de substitut lorsque certaines définitions de la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus sont erronées. L'incidence positive ou négative de la taille demeure après l'application de nombreux procédés visant à atténuer l'influence de chacune de ces erreurs de définition. Les auteurs cernent les conséquences que peut entraîner la négligence de l'incidence positive ou négative anormale de la taille, dans le cas d'études portant sur la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus. Les études en cause sont celles dans lesquelles est omise la taille de l'entreprise (le coefficient de la réaction estimée aux bénéfices étant alors biaisé à la hausse), celles qui font intervenir la taille de l'entreprise à titre de variable additive linéaire (le coefficient estimé relatif à la taille de l'entreprise ne pouvant être interprété, de façon générale) et celles qui font intervenir d'autres variables en corrélation avec la taille de l'entreprise (leurs coefficients estimés étant, dans ce cas, habituellement faussés).

Manufacturing firms can manipulate income by producing in excess of the quantity needed to meet current period demand, thereby allocating part of current period fixed manufacturing overhead costs from cost of goods sold to inventory. Because it is subject to manipulation, the component of earnings due to producing in excess of sales may be of lower quality than the remaining component of earnings. We investigate this possibility using a regression of security returns on unexpected income and an estimate of the change in percent of production added to inventory ( CPAI ). An analytical model indicates that CPAI determines the “earnings surprise” subject to manipulation by overproducing. Assuming the market recognizes this, the coefficient on CPAI should be negative because this low quality component must be deducted from the total “good news” conveyed by the change in reported earnings. Alternatively, CPAI may convey good or bad news to the market that is unrelated to the manipulation of current period earnings. Firms may increase the percent of production added to inventory in anticipation of high levels of future sales. In this case, the estimated coefficient on CPAI should be positive. Or, if the increase in the percent of production added to inventory reflects anticipation of a strike or an unexpected downturn in current sales, the estimated coefficient should be negative. Cross‐sectional tests using a large sample of manufacturing firms indicate a significant positive relation between security returns and CPAI. This finding is consistent with market participants viewing CPAI as a leading indicator of firm performance. Although the results are most supportive of CPAI conveying good news, there is some evidence that CPAI is used by managers to smooth earnings and, for firms classified as smoothing earnings, there is weak evidence that the component of earnings related to CPAI is viewed by market participants to be of lower quality.

Steve Matsunaga, Terry Shevlin, D. Shores, Disqualifying Dispositions of Incentive Stock Options: Tax Benefits versus Financial Reporting Costs, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 30, Studies on Accounting and Taxation (1992), pp. 37-68

Using a sample of LIFO users, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of adopting a simultaneous equations approach to study managers' adjustments of interacting accounting measures that meet multiple objectives. We focus on the importance of considering differences in the costs and the effectiveness of adjusting accounting measures. In addition, we examine managers' objectives in subsequent years and how adjustments' reversals affect those objectives. Although generally consistent with earlier studies of LIFO inventory adjustments, our results indicate that modelling interacting accounting measures, such as other current accruals and depreciation, leads to differing conclusions about the role of taxes.

We examine whether executive stock options (ESOs) provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects. For a sample of oil and gas producers, we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity (our proxy for exploration risk) increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEO's options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). Both ESO risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. We find evidence that ESO risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking. Additional tests indicate that ESO risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where ESO risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined. Overall, our results are consistent with ESOs providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk-related incentive problems.

Harris and O'Brien (2018) investigate whether U.S. tax policy distorts U.S. multinationals’ (MNCs) investment. They find that MNCs facing higher repatriation tax costs engage in fewer domestic acquisitions. The study re-examines the results in two prior studies that found no effect (Hanlon et al. 2015) and a positive effect (Martin et al. 2015) by introducing a new proxy for repatriation tax costs: A binary variable for whether the MNC uses the Double Irish structure. We critique the theory underlying the prediction as well as the proxy. We conclude that caution should be exercised in taking the results at face value.

This paper traces the development of archival, microeconomic-based, empirical income tax research in accounting over the last 15 years. The paper details three major areas of research: (i) the coordination of tax and non-tax factors, (ii) the effects of taxes on asset prices, and (iii) the taxation of multijurisdictional (international and interstate) commerce. Methodological concerns of particular interest to this field also are discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible directions for future research.