This paper provides a new explanation for the use of convertible securities in venture capital. A key property of convertible preferred equity is that it allocates different cash flow rights, depending on whether exit occurs by acquisition or IPO. The paper builds a model with double moral hazard, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist provide value-adding effort. The optimal contract gives the venture capitalist more cash flow rights in acquisitions than IPOs. This explains the use of convertible preferred equity, including automatic conversion at IPO. Contingent control rights are also important for achieving efficient exit decisions.

Some venture capital investors seek purely financial gains while others, such as corporations, also pursue strategic objectives. The paper examines a model where a strategic investor can achieve synergies, but can also face a conflict of interest with the entrepreneur. If the start-up is a complement to the strategic partner, it is optimal to obtain funding from the strategic investor. If the start-up is a mild substitute, the entrepreneur prefers an independent venture capitalist. With a strong substitute, syndication becomes optimal, such that the independent venture capitalist is the active lead investor and the strategic partner a passive co-investor. The expected returns for the entrepreneur are nonmonotonic, lowest for a mild substitute, and higher for a strong substitute as well as for a complement. The paper also explains why a strategic investor often pays a higher valuation than an independent venture capitalist.

Journal Article The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital Get access Thomas Hellmann, Thomas Hellmann Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Manju Puri Manju Puri Stanford University Address correspondence to Manju Puri, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, October 2000, Pages 959–984, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.4.959 Published: 15 June 2015

This paper examines bank behavior in venture capital. It considers the relation between a bank's venture capital investments and its subsequent lending, which can be thought of as intertemporal cross-selling. Theory suggests that unlike independent venture capital firms, banks may be strategic investors who seek complementarities between venture capital and lending activities. We find evidence that banks use venture capital investments to build lending relationships. Having a prior relationship with a company in the venture capital market increases a bank's chance of subsequently granting a loan to that company. Companies can benefit from these relationships through more favorable loan pricing. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand‐collected data set on Silicon Valley start‐ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture‐capital‐backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.

This paper re-examines the role of investor power in a model of staged equity financing. It shows how the usual effect where market power reduces valuations can be reversed in later rounds. Once they become insiders, powerful investors may use their market power to increase, not decrease valuations. The critical determinant is whether the insider invests above or below the pro-rata threshold. Even though powerful investors initially lower valuations, companies prefer to bring them inside, to leverage their power in later financing rounds. The paper generates novel predictions about valuations and investor returns.

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.

This paper develops a theory of how angel and venture capital markets interact. Entrepreneurs first receive angel then venture capital funding. The two investor types are ‘friends’ in that they rely upon each other׳s investments. However, they are also ‘foes,’ because at the later stage the venture capitalists no longer need the angels. Using a costly search model we derive the equilibrium deal flows across the two markets, endogenously deriving market sizes, competitive structures, valuation levels, and exit rates. We also examine the role of legal protection for angel investments.

We analyze the funding of start-up companies across financing rounds, focusing on the dynamic interactions between angel investors and venture capitalists. Using unique data from British Columbia, Canada, we show that angels and venture capitalists are dynamic substitutes. This substitutes pattern applies across the performance range of companies. It is less pronounced for serial angels. An instrumental variable analysis, based on available investor tax credits, suggests that the substitutes pattern is driven by company characteristics. Overall, the evidence points to the existence of parallel streams of angel and venture capital funding, with fewer transitions between streams than is traditionally assumed.

This article examines enterprises funded by government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs). We find that enterprises funded by both GVCs and private venture capitalists (PVCs) obtain more investment than enterprises funded purely by PVCs, and much more than those funded purely by GVCs. Also, markets with more GVC funding have more VC funding per enterprise and more VC-funded enterprises, suggesting that GVC finance largely augments rather than displaces PVC finance. There is also a positive association between mixed GVC/PVC funding and successful exits, as measured by initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions, attributable largely to the additional investment.