The market for leveraged loans that provide debt financing for risky companies has been on an exceptional growth path over the last decade. With the increased presence of investment funds in this market, however, come increased concerns – namely, whether a sharp rise of redemptions by fund investors could set off a cascade of drops in secondary loan prices and whether these price falls could trigger further redemptions, ultimately fueling a downward price and liquidity spiral? This paper provides evidence consistent with the view that in times of loan market stress, fund flows and loan price returns have been pro-cyclical, i.e., have reinforced each other's movements. Furthermore, fund outflows foster market illiquidity. Importantly, the paper identifies lending by CLOs as a channel through which outflow-induced price dislocations in the secondary market transmit to corporate borrowing, making it harder for leveraged companies to rollover their existing debt exactly at a time when liquidity is needed most (in market downs).

The so called Magnetar trade (a kind of capital structure arbitrage on the US housing market, using CDS and synthetic CDOs, and exploiting rating-dependent mispricing of risk) has gained a high publicity due to a Pulitzer Prize awarded media story from two journalists of ProPublica (an online news outlet). The story essentially claimed that the mortgage investment strategy of the hedge fund Magnetar during the period between 2006 and mid 2007 was based on a desire to construct CDO deals with riskier assets so that they could place bets that portions of their own deals would fail. This paper provides several pieces of evidence in line with the argument that tranches from Magnetar-sponsored CDOs present overly risky investments. However, investors and rating agencies appear to have adjusted their required spread levels and ratings to reflect this higher riskiness, at least to some extent.

Based on a sample of 3254 floating rate tranches from 617 ABS-CDOs (collateralized debt obligations backed by asset-backed securities), this paper tests the “rating overdependence” hypothesis – i.e., that ratings of structured products are a sufficient statistic (in terms of predicting future credit performance) for yield spreads at origination. The paper’s findings are fourfold. First, yield spreads at issuance predict future performance of ABS-CDO tranches even after controlling for the information contained in ratings. Second, the ability of yield spreads to predict future performance, however, is driven exclusively by ratings below AAA (and, to a lesser extent, also by the lowest priority AAA tranches), whereas spreads of super senior AAA tranches show no information content. Third, the predictive ability of yield spreads is lower for tranches from later vintages and for tranches from deals with more complex collateral pools. Fourth, the conditional correlation between ratings and spreads, in turn, is increasing in time and higher for tranches from complex deals. In sum, the evidence indicates that investors in (especially AAA) tranches from later and more complex deals have avoided performing costly due diligence on the securities they bought.

While credit rating agencies disclose all public ratings as a matter of policy, a firm can choose whether to make a so called private rating public or to keep it confidential. This paper analyzes the economic role of such rating publication rights. In particular, the paper tries to answer the following two questions: (1) If firms have scope to disclose agency ratings at their own discretion, can they use this discretion strategically and conceal low-quality ratings?, and (2), if this is the case, what are the economic implications for rated firms, unrated firms and the rating agency, resulting from strategically motivated selective rating disclosures? Using a theoretical model, it is shown that an equilibrium with partial nondisclosure of low-quality ratings can emerge whenever investors cannot be sure whether rating nondisclosure is due to the firm being not rated, or due to the rating’s adverse content. Moreover, since from an investors’ perspective, strategically acting rated firms and unrated firms are pooled, unrated firms’ debt is always under-valued (compared to a situation in which investors know that the firm is not rated), and the debt of firms concealing their rating is always over-valued.

This paper shows that the well known “duration” and “cohort” methods for estimating transition probabilities of external bond ratings are not suitable for internal rating data. More precisely, the duration method cannot and the cohort method should not be used in connection with banks’ ratings generated from internal models. Structural differences within the borrower monitoring process of banks and rating agencies are responsible for this result. A Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedure, which accounts for the peculiarities of internal bank ratings, is introduced and applied to data from a German bank. The empirical results indicate that the differences between cohort and ML transition matrices are both, statistically and economically significant. Furthermore, evidence of rating reversals, business cycle dependent transition probabilities and on the factors which determine the borrower monitoring intensity of banks is provided.

This paper studies empirically the determinants of new account fraud risk within two dimensions: the probability of fraud, and the expected and unexpected (monetary) loss-per-account due to fraud. By fraud risk, we mean the risk that a bank fails to enforce a debt because the identity of the person incurring the debt cannot be ascertained. Using a unique and rich data set of account applicants, provided by a German Internet-only bank, we find that fraud risk is highly sensitive to demographic and socio-economic variables like nationality, gender, marital status, age, occupation, and urbanisation. For example, foreigners are 22.25 times more likely to commit account fraud than Germans, and men are 2.5 times more risky than women.