High-frequency reversals are an economically important characteristic of the returns to tradeable claims to the market portfolio. This paper demonstrates that short-horizon negative autocorrelation can arise in a tractable model of agents with tournament-type preferences. Intuitively, investors act as if they are averse to missing out on a trend, causing the risk premium to move strongly counter to realized returns. The model features fully rationalizing agents, complete markets, and no exogenous transaction demand. Plausible parameterizations can match the autocorrelation in the data. Supporting evidence on novel first and second moment implications is presented.

This paper analyzes endogenous variations in aggregate liquidity that arise in standard representative-agent endowment economies. I introduce a natural definition of liquidity, essentially a shadow elasticity, that characterizes the price impact function or bid/ask spread that a small trader would experience. I compute this quantity for some tractable examples and uncover a rich variety of predictions that, in some cases, appear consistent with levels and covariations observed in the data. The results have important implications for the pricing and hedging of liquidity risk.

ABSTRACT Recent work by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) has established a negative relationship between stock returns and the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. I offer a simple explanation for this phenomenon based on the interpretation of dispersion as a proxy for unpriced information risk arising when asset values are unobservable. The relationship then follows from a general options‐pricing result: For a levered firm, expected returns should always decrease with the level of idiosyncratic asset risk. This story is formalized with a straightforward model. Reasonable parameter values produce large effects, and the theory's main empirical prediction is supported in cross‐sectional tests.

ABSTRACT Momentum effects in stock returns need not imply investor irrationality, heterogeneous information, or market frictions. A simple, single‐firm model with a standard pricing kernel can produce such effects when expected dividend growth rates vary over time. An enhanced model, under which persistent growth rate shocks occur episodically, can match many of the features documented by the empirical research. The same basic mechanism could potentially account for underreaction anomalies in general.

Some important puzzles in macro finance can be resolved in a model featuring systematically varying volatility of unpriced shocks to firms׳ earnings. In the data, the correlation between corporate debt and stock market valuations is low. The model accounts for this via the opposing effect of unpriced earnings risk on levered debt and equity prices. The model also explains the low (or nonexistent) risk-reward relation for the market portfolio of levered equity via the opposing effects of unpriced and priced uncertainty (both components of stock volatility) on the levered equity risk premium. Versions of the model calibrated to empirical measures of both types of fundamental risk can quantitatively substantiate these explanations. Variation in residual earning dispersion accounts for a significant fraction of observed disagreement between debt and equity valuations and of realized stock volatility. The implication that the two components of risk should forecast the levered equity risk premium with opposite signs is also supported in the data. The results are a notable advance for risk-based asset pricing.

Using a unique dataset of trades and limit orders for S&P 500 futures, we decompose the aggregate risk into a component driven by the impact of net market orders and a component unrelated to net orders. The first component—flow-driven risk—is large, accounting for approximately 50% of market variance, and it is not transient. This risk represents the joint effect of net trade demand and the price impact of that demand—i.e., illiquidity. We find that flows are largely unpredictable, and lagged flows have no price impact. Flow-driven risk is time varying because price impact is highly variable. Illiquidity rises with market volatility, but not with flow uncertainty. Net selling increases illiquidity, which amplifies downside flow-driven risk. The findings are consistent with flow-driven shocks resulting from fluctuations in aggregate risk-bearing capacity. Under this interpretation, investors with constant risk tolerance should trade against such shocks (i.e., “supply liquidity”) to achieve substantial utility gains. Quantitatively accounting for the scale of flow-driven risk poses a major challenge for asset pricing theory.

Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, a greater number of insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation features detection and punishment policies that become stricter as the number of insiders increases, reducing insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts during the period 2000–2006 and relate these to the number of financing participants. Suspicious stock and options activity is associated with more equity participants, while suspicious bond and CDS activity is associated with more debt participants — consistent with models of limited competition among insiders but inconsistent with our model of optimal regulation.

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.