This paper analyzes the impact of changes in regulatory priorities and resource allocation on criminal enforcement of white‐collar criminal activities. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a shock to the FBI's priorities and allocation of investigative resources, as well as variation in the Muslim population in the United States, I examine whether prioritization of counterterrorism investigations after 9/11 is associated with weaker enforcement of laws targeting white‐collar crime. I then use a difference‐in‐differences estimation to study the magnitude of any increase in white‐collar crime resulting from reduced oversight. I find a significantly greater reduction in white‐collar criminal cases referred by FBI field offices that shifted more of their investigative focus away from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism. Further, geographic areas in the jurisdictions of FBI field offices with greater shifts in attention from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism experienced greater increases in wire fraud, illegal insider‐trading activities, and fraud within financial institutions.

The apparent convergence of OECD income levels since 1950 is subjected to rigorous testing that suggests that there has occurred a systematic process of catching up in levels of total factor productivity. An econometric model of relative economic growth exhibits parameter stability over three decades, including the period after 1973, and statistical robustness, particularly with respect to sample selection. A reassessment is made of OECD comparative economic growth performance.

We study whether federal judges’ personal exposure to financial fraud affects their professional behavior, in the form of sentencing outcomes in white‐collar cases. Following the methodology outlined in our registered report, we construct a novel measure of financial fraud exposure based on judges’ direct shareholdings in firms that commit financial fraud. Using this measure, we exploit the random assignment of cases to judges to examine whether judges exposed to fraud in one firm are (1) less likely to rule in favor of defendants in white‐collar cases involving other firms and (2) less likely to grant favorable pretrial motions to defendants. We find minimal evidence in support of either (1) or (2), concluding that for all but the most serious frauds, judges are unlikely to let their personal victimhood experience affect their professional sentencing behavior with respect to related cases. Our study broadens our understanding of the spillover effects of financial fraud enforcement and contributes to the literature on how judges’ personal experiences can shape judicial decision‐making.