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Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective

Journal of Finance 2005 60(4), 2083-2123
While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.

The Nature and Persistence of Buyback Anomalies

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(4), 1693-1745
Using recent data, we reject the hypothesis that the buyback anomalies first reported by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990, Journal of Finance 45:455–77) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, Journal of Financial Economics 39:181–208) have disappeared over time. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that open market repurchases are a response to a market overreaction to bad news: significant analyst downgrades, combined with overly pessimistic forecasts of long-term earnings. Stock prices after tender offers are set as if all investors tender their shares, but empirically they do not. Thus, the arbitrage opportunity persists because the market sets prices as if the average, not the marginal investor, determines the stock price.

The many facets of privately negotiated stock repurchases

Journal of Financial Economics 2005 75(2), 361-395
We investigate the causes and consequences of 737 privately negotiated share repurchases in the years 1984–2001. In contrast to the negative announcement returns and positive repurchase premiums reported by past research, we find positive announcement returns and premiums that are not significantly different from zero. Only when we investigate the 60 greenmail events separately do we find results similar to past research. However, for this subsample, we find long-horizon excess returns that are comparable to the average 18% repurchase premium, challenging the widely accepted opinion that managers overpay in greenmail repurchases. Moreover, we find that our understanding of the event improves when we split the non-greenmail repurchases according to the price paid. Repurchases at a premium can be modeled as signals, while other repurchases are mere wealth transfers between the corporation and the selling stockholders, the extent of which is determined by the relative bargaining power of the seller and the repurchasing firm.

The CEO pay slice

Journal of Financial Economics 2011 102(1), 199-221
We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.

Are Buybacks Good for Long-Term Shareholder Value? Evidence from Buybacks around the World

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2019 54(5), 1899-1935
Using a sample of over 9,000 buyback announcements from 31 non-U.S. countries, we find support for the results of studies based on U.S. data: On average, share repurchases are associated with significant positive short- and long-term excess returns. However, excess returns depend on the likelihood of undervaluation and the efficiency and liquidity of equity markets. In contrast to findings in U.S. markets, we do not find that these long-term excess returns are simply a compensation for takeover risk or have become less significant in recent years.