This paper studies financial policy, investment decisions and the threat of dismissal when managers value control and investments generate manager-specific value. A high probability of investigation focuses the manager on the profitability of replacement and therefore manager-specific value. The probability of an investigation increases when the firm enters bankruptcy. Thus, high debt levels focus the manager on investments that dissuade replacement during bankruptcy procedures. Dividends relax the manager's focus on manager-specific value since there is a lower probability of an investigation following a missed dividend. The ability to make dividend payments, however, is related to ex-post performance and can improve replacement decisions. When managerial quality is commonly known, the expected value of the firm is maximized with a combination of debt and dividend commitments. When managerial quality is hidden information, it is optimal for the combination of debt and dividend commitments to signal quality.

We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Indeed, in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal.

In this article, we measure the impact of on‐site safety inspections on the frequency of work‐related injury and death in the Alberta construction sector, 1987–92. The data are disaggregated by subindustry allowing different risk levels to be associated with different work activities. In our sample, there is a dramatic decrease in inspection activity which alows us to assess the necessity for continuing with current levels of inspection effort. We find that on‐site safety inspections have no effect on the risk of accident and injury but do have a positive effect in reducing the number of work‐related fatalities.

Should the proportion of risky assets in the risky part of an investor’s portfolio depend on the investor’s risk aversion? According to basic financial theory, in particular the mutual-fund separation theorem with a riskless asset, the answer is no. The theorem states that rational investors should divide their assets between a riskless asset and a risky mutual fund, the composition of which is the same for all investors. Risk aversion affects only the allocation between the riskless asset and the fund. However, Niko Canner et al. (1997), CMW hereafter, observed that popular investment advice does not conform to this theory. They reported the stocks, bonds, and cash allocations recommended by four advisors for conservative, moderate, and aggressive investors. As shown in Table 1, which is reproduced from CMW, the advisors recommend a bond/stock ratio that varies directly with risk aversion. For example, Fidelity recommends a bond/stock ratio of 1.50 for a “conservative” (more riskaverse) investor, a ratio of 1.00 for a “moderate” (less risk-averse) investor, and a ratio of 0.46 for an “aggressive” (still less risk-averse) investor. The inconsistency between such advice and the separation theorem is called an asset allocation puzzle by CMW. They attempted to solve the puzzle by relaxing key assumptions in the theory, but finally reached a negative conclusion: “Although we cannot rule out the possibility that popular advice is consistent with some model of rational behavior, we have so far been unable to find such a model” (p. 181). However, they suggested that consideration of intertemporal trading might help resolve the puzzle. In the present paper, we provide theoretical support for the popular advice. The two key insights are that the investor’s horizon may exceed the maturity of the cash asset and that the investor rebalances the portfolio as time passes. If the investor’s horizon exceeds the maturity of cash, which might be a money-market security with maturity of one to six months, then cash is not the riskless asset as is commonly assumed in the basic theory. In a theory allowing portfolio rebalancing, as opposed to a buy-and-hold framework, it is not unreasonable to assume that the investor can synthesize a riskless asset (a zero-coupon bond maturing at the horizon) using a bond fund and cash. Then bonds will be both in the (synthetic) riskless asset and in the risky mutual fund and we show that in this case the theoretical bond/stock ratio varies directly with risk aversion for any hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) investor. As an example of the type of results that a specific model can produce, we provide a continuous-time model with closed-form solutions, which produces theoretical bond/stock ratios similar to the popular advice. The present paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we analyze the popular advice in terms of the theory of mutual-fund separation of David Cass and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1970). We show that this theory is relevant both in static and dynamic frameworks and use it to analyze the popular advice in complete and incomplete markets. In Section II, we analyze the popular advice in the context of Robert C. Merton’s (1971) continuous-time statement of mutualfund separation and present an illustrative model in which a CRRA investor makes continuous-time portfolio decisions under interest rate and stock price uncertainty. In Section III, numerical results are compared with the popular advice. Section IV is a conclusion. * Bajeux-Besnainou: Department of Finance, School of Business and Public Management, George Washington University, 2023 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20052; Jordan: National Economic Research Associates, 1255 23rd Street NW, Washington, DC 20037; Portait: CNAM and ESSEC, Finance Chair CNAM, 2 Rue Conte, Paris, France. This research was supported by a grant from the Institute for Quantitative Investment Research. We thank two anonymous referees for their comments. 1 HARA functions include quadratic utility, which is one way of justifying mean-variance preferences, and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. Both quadratic and CRRA utility were considered in the CMW analysis.

Given the evidence that the level of liquidity affects asset returns, a reasonable hypothesis is that the second moment of liquidity should be positively related to asset returns, provided agents care about the risk associated with fluctuations in liquidity. Motivated by this observation, we analyze the relation between expected equity returns and the level as well as the volatility of trading activity, a proxy for liquidity. We document a result contrary to our initial hypothesis, namely, a negative and surprisingly strong cross-sectional relationship between stock returns and the variability of dollar trading volume and share turnover, after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, and the level of dollar volume or share turnover. This effect survives a number of robustness checks, and is statistically and economically significant. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of trading activity-related variables in the cross-section of expected stock returns.

In this article we ask: what kind of information and how much of it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosures are considered. One is information that complements the information available only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementary information). The second is information that is orthogonal to that which any investor can acquire and thus complements the information available to all investors (preprocessed complementary information). And the third is information that substitutes for the information of the informed investors in that it reveals to all what was previously known only by the informed (substitute information). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium, all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information. Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementary information disclosure by firms strengthens investors’ private incentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosure weakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, while complementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effect on financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosure weakens those incentives.

This paper estimates a dynamic model of schooling attainment to investigate the sources of racial and ethnic disparity in college attendance. Parental income in the child's adolescent years is a strong predictor of this disparity. This is widely interpreted to mean that credit constraints facing families during the college-going years are important. Using NLSY data, we find that it is the long-run factors associated with parental background and family environment, and not credit constraints facing prospective students in the college-going years, that account for most of the racial-ethnic college-going differential. Policies aimed at improving these long-term family and environmental factors are more likely to be successful in eliminating college attendance differentials than short-term tuition reduction and family income supplement policies aimed at families with college age children.

We examine the future sales implications of product quality measures for 11 plants of a manufacturing group in a Fortune 500 firm. Our results indicate that both financial quality measures, such as external failure costs incurred due to product failures at customer sites, and nonfinancial quality measures, such as defect rates and on-time deliveries, are leading indicators of future sales. While changes in defects and on-time deliveries affect sales in the subsequent quarter, changes in external failure costs are negatively associated with sales two and three quarters hence. Corroborating popular claims about the importance of external failure costs, we find that a $1 increase in external failure costs is associated with a cumulative sales decrease of $26, or approximately $10.40 in lost profits.

This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We also find less honesty under a contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the manager than under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how the surplus is divided between the manager and the firm. The optimal agency contract yields more firm profit than a contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. However, a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of subjects' preferences for honest reporting, yields the highest firm profit. These results suggest that firms may be able to design more profitable employment contracts than those identified by conventional economic analysis.