Abstract We propose a direct test of the explanation by Modigliani and Cohn (MC) for the positive correlation between inflation and equity values—that it results from investors’ money illusion. This explanation, unlike its main rivals, suggests that because in inflationary periods dividends will, on average, be higher than expected, dividend announcements will trigger positive abnormal returns. These will be higher the higher the inflation, and the more levered the firm. The behavior of abnormal returns of US stocks on dividend-announcement days from 1955 to 2007 supports these predictions. We investigate alternative explanations of our results. None dominates MC’s.

The purpose of this essay is to review the books Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, and Pillars of Prosperity by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. The essay briefly discusses the main contributions of the books and the role of politics for economic performance. The review then discusses these contributions in the light of recent research on organizational economics, particularly the modern theory of the firm. (JEL D23, D72, O10, O47, O57)

Abstract This article uses linked worker-firm data in the United States to estimate the transitional costs associated with reallocating workers from newly regulated industries to other sectors of the economy in the context of new environmental regulations. The focus on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to examine previously unobserved economic outcomes such as nonemployment and long-run earnings losses from job transitions, both of which are critical to understanding the reallocative costs associated with these policies. Using plant-level panel variation induced by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), I find that the reallocative costs of environmental policy are significant. Workers in newly regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than $5.4 billion in forgone earnings for the years after the change in policy. Most of these costs are driven by nonemployment and lower earnings in future employment, highlighting the importance of longitudinal data for characterizing the costs and consequences of labor market adjustment. Relative to the estimated benefits of the 1990 CAAA, these one-time transitional costs are small.

Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (DGHR, in this issue) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) to elicit their views on earnings quality, broader trends in financial reporting, and the prevalence of earnings management. They provide some interesting insights on these issues. We discuss how CFOs' incentives in the financial reporting process are likely to affect what we can learn from them about earnings quality. We also discuss how DGHR's methodological choices regarding survey sample and question design affect their inferences, including what we can infer about the prevalence and magnitude of earnings management.

In this paper, we propose an instrumental variable approach to constructing confidence sets (CS's) for the true parameter in models defined by conditional moment inequalities/equalities. We show that by properly choosing instrument functions, one can transform conditional moment inequalities/equalities into unconditional ones without losing identification power. Based on the unconditional moment inequalities/equalities, we construct CS's by inverting Cramér–von Mises-type or Kolmogorov–Smirnov-type tests. Critical values are obtained using generalized moment selection (GMS) procedures. We show that the proposed CS's have correct uniform asymptotic coverage probabilities. New methods are required to establish these results because an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter affects the asymptotic distributions. We show that the tests considered are consistent against all fixed alternatives and typically have power against n−1/2-local alternatives to some, but not all, sequences of distributions in the null hypothesis. Monte Carlo simulations for five different models show that the methods perform well in finite samples.

This paper examines whether firms that deviate from an empirically modeled (“expected”) credit rating engage in earnings management activities, as measured by abnormal accruals and real activities earnings management. We find evidence that firms use income-increasing (-decreasing) earnings management activities when they are below (above) their expected ratings. We then test whether such actions are successful in helping these firms move toward their expected credit ratings. The results suggest that firms below or above their expected credit ratings may be able to move toward expected ratings through the use of directional earnings management.

Compelling empirical evidence documenting a material effect of corporate taxes on leverage decisions is limited, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for the firm's tax benefit of debt. We examine leverage decisions across taxable and nontaxable real estate firms—firms for which we can measure the relative tax benefit of debt with little error. The tax hypothesis implies that for firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Consistent with this, leverage ratios of taxable real estate firms are higher than their nontaxable counterparts, but the magnitude of this difference is at most one-half of that implied by studies that employ simulated marginal tax rates.