For 234 large non-financial corporations using derivatives, we report the magnitude of their risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. If interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices change simultaneously by three standard deviations, the median firm's derivatives portfolio, at most, generates 15 million in cash and 31 million in value. These amounts are modest relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the importance of firms’ derivative use.

Prior research has examined the firm-level performance implications of “busy” boards. Firm-level analysis, however, masks important heterogeneity in the time constraints and expertise of individual busy directors. We develop and validate shareholder voting as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction. Our director-specific tests provide compelling evidence that the potential costs of busy directors outweigh their benefits. At the same time, we uncover new sources of heterogeneity among busy directors. For example, the downsides are more pronounced for directors who sit on boards where fiscal year ends cluster in the same month. Our analysis highlights the role of shareholder voting in board composition research.

In a recent and influential empirical paper, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (FLOS) [2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 295–327] conclude that accruals quality (AQ) is a priced risk factor. We explain that FLOS’ regressions examining a contemporaneous relation between excess returns and factor returns do not test the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor. We conduct appropriate asset-pricing tests for determining whether a potential risk factor explains expected returns, and find no evidence that AQ is a priced risk factor.

Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the dissemination of mine safety information in SEC filings has real effects on mine safety. We discuss the extent to which Christensen et al.’s results generalize to a research question that we consider of broader interest to accounting researchers, specifically where and when mandated disclosure in SEC filings can increase the dissemination of information. We also discuss identification of causal effects and generalizability concerns more broadly in the context of large sample studies and quasi-natural experiments, as well as potential ways authors might address these concerns in accounting research.

We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.

In this study we specify a simple earnings model, present managerial discretion hypotheses from existing literature, and assume efficient markets in order to evaluate five discretionary-accrual models. The five discretionary accrual models are the same as those evaluated in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]. The models are Healy [1985]; DeAngelo [1986]; Jones [1991]; Jones as modified in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]; and the industry model proposed by Dechow and Sloan [1991]. We specify three managerial discretion hypotheses. First, under the performance measure hypothesis, discretionary accruals help managers produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance (i.e., earnings) than using nondiscretionary accruals alone. Second, the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis is that discretionary accruals are employed to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, discretionary accruals are noise in earnings. This is the noise hypothesis. Our contribution is to make the joint hypotheses explicit and generate explicit predictions about the relative variability of earnings components,

We re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged in that they fail to take full advantage of debt tax shields. We show prior results suggesting underleverage stems from biased estimates of tax benefits from interest deductions. We develop improved estimates of marginal tax rates using a non-parametric procedure that produces more accurate estimates of the distribution of future taxable income. We show that additional debt would provide firms with much smaller tax benefits than previously thought, and when expected distress costs and difficult-to-measure non-debt tax shields are also considered, it appears plausible that most firms have tax-efficient capital structures.

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors.

We find mixed support for the hypothesis that a “New Economy” subperiod occurred in the late 1990s in which the relation between equity value and traditional financial variables differs from previous periods. We examine a regression model of equity value on financial variables over 25 years for a broad firm sample and for firm subsamples thought to be emblematic of the New Economy. We find the regression model's explanatory power declined in the New Economy subperiod for all firm subsamples. However, for all subsamples, the regression model's structure during the New Economy subperiod is not unusual compared to other subperiods.

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.