We demonstrate that a persistent pattern exists in the evolution of the MTB ratio from 1999 to 2023, wherein firms with high (low) MTB ratios tend to maintain those levels over time. The persistence of the MTB ratio is independent of industry effects and cannot be well explained by accounting performance. Intangible investment plays a crucial role in determining the MTB ratio, and its persistence is primarily maintained through continued internal intangible investment rather than external mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, although U.S. firms have increased their investment in intangible assets over the past 25 years, the gap between high- and low-MTB firms in intangible investment has widened. Our results suggest that the basis of stock value has shifted from tangible to intangible investments over time.

We evaluate the performance changes of 634 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on China's two exchanges upon share issuing privatisation (SIP) in the period 1994–1998. We find that SIP is effective in improving SOEs’ earnings ability, real sales, and workers’ productivity but is not successful in improving profit returns and leverage after privatisation. We also find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm performance after SIP, which suggests that legal persons behave differently from the state government. Surprisingly, foreign ownership does not show uniformly strong, positive impacts on firm performance.

We use a time-series GARCH framework with the conditional variance/covariance as proxies for systematic risk to reexamine the proposition by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Rogalski and Tinic (1986) that the January effect may be a phenomenon of risk compensation in the month. We find no clear evidence that either conditional volatility or unconditional volatility in January is predominantly higher across the sampling years. Hence, against the proposition, the January effect is not due to risk per se. Rather, we find strong evidence that the January effect is due to higher compensation for risk in the month. This may be possible if investors have an increasing RRA utility function. Although many studies find that volatility tends to be higher in January, we find it to be period-specific and mostly in value-weighted return series, but not in equal-weighted return series. This is true both for the unconditional and conditional return volatility.

China has an A-share market that is open only to local investors and a B-share market that is open only to foreign investors. Contrary to what has been observed in other markets with a similar segmented structure, the China B shares trade at a discount relative to the A shares. We show that the phenomenon can still be explained by basic economic principles. Specifically, the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the B-share market. We find that when more H shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger. This is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz and Wasserfallen (Stulz, R., Wasserfallen, W., 1995. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019–1057).

We investigate why the Chinese government chooses to perform share issue privatization (SIP) of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Hong Kong, despite the benefit of facilitating the domestic stock market development if performing SIP in China (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) and the higher cost to list in Hong Kong. We address this issue by arguing that the positive effect of SIPs on the development of the domestic market may have limitations, especially when the domestic market is not well developed and cannot absorb rapid and large-scale SIP activities. To maintain domestic market order, it may be optimal to carry out SIP in overseas markets. Furthermore, by listing shares in developed overseas markets, SOEs from the less developed countries could leverage on the overseas markets’ better accounting, governance, and legal standards. By examining a sample of 92 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and the relevant control samples of purely domestically listed Chinese firms during the period of 1993–2006, we find supporting evidence for both arguments.

We examine stock trading activities in days before Chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share-structure reform. There is significant evidence that, relative to a benchmark period, institutional investors bought more event firms’ shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement. Randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms, which suggests that some institutions had inside information. Moreover, large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2days. The evidence is consistent with the prediction by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that, when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information, they will trade aggressively. We also find that over the reform period, the median share value change of event firms is 6% higher than that of control firms. Our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in China.

We study the impact of mainland Chinese listings in Hong Kong on the quality and development of the Hong Kong equity market. At the macro-level, we find that the increasing presence of mainland Chinese stocks in Hong Kong increases the size, trading volume, and its link with the China and world markets but reduces the overall volatility of the Hong Kong stock market. At the firm level, the increase affects the market quality, resulting in lower turnover rate, higher Amihud illiquidity ratio, and higher spread for non-mainland Chinese firms. Furthermore, such an increase in presence causes Hong Kong stocks to move in a more synchronized way and reduces these firms investment sensitivity to stock price movement, implying deterioration in the information environment. As a whole, the increasing presence of Chinese companies in Hong Kong brings benefits to the Hong Kong market, yet not without cost.

Our comprehensive study of 30 Singapore government-linked companies (GLCs) covering the period 1964 to1998 shows that share issue privatization has some positive impacts on their performance. However, there was no evidence that the GLCs were less profitable than a selected group of non-GLCs that match by size and industry. Taking a buy-and-hold strategy, we found that GLC stocks provide statistically equivalent returns relative to market or other control sample returns over various investment horizons of up to four years. Given that GLCs also perform as well as averages for the market and industry up to five years before their listing, we argue that Singapore's government-owned enterprises are comparable to privately run enterprises in efficiency.

We examine two inconclusive issues in the IPO (initial public offering) underpricing literature. It is unclear whether private firms or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) underprice their IPOs more and how the institutional environment affects IPO underpricing. Using a much larger China IPO sample of SOEs, we conclude that SOEs underprice their IPOs more than private firms. Specifically, SOEs controlled by the central government (CSOEs) underprice their IPOs 27 percentage points more than private firms, whereas SOEs controlled by local governments (LSOEs) underprice theirs 7 percentage points more than those of private firms. Using the National Economic Research Institute Index of Marketization (NERIIM) to measure the institutional environment, we find that one index score improvement in institutional environment is associated with a two percentage-point reduction in IPO underpricing. Importantly, a better institutional environment reduces IPO underpricing most effectively for private firms, followed by LSOEs, and the least for CSOEs.