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Executive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United States

Journal of Corporate Finance 1999 5(3), 277-301
This paper compares executive pay–performance sensitivities between Canadian firms and US firms. Examining the data for 365 Canadian firms and 675 US firms over the years 1991–1994, we find that the pay–performance sensitivity associated with direct pay and stock ownership is smaller in Canadian firms than in US firms but that the difference diminishes as firm size increases. We also find that during this period Canadian firms underperformed US firms and Canadian CEOs were paid substantially lower than were their US counterparts. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the pay–performance relationship, depending on the intensity of economic regulation, affects corporate performance.

Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: comment

Journal of Financial Economics 2001 62(3), 559-571
Himmelberg et al. (J. Financial Econom. 53 (1999) 353–384) argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. I show that managerial ownership, while substantially different across firms, typically changes slowly from year to year within a company. With rational managers maximising long-term utility, small, one-year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within-year changes in performance. By relying on within variation, fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists.

CEO Compensation in Japan: Why So Different from the United States?

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2018 53(5), 2261-2292
In Mar. 2010, Japan’s financial regulator implemented the country’s first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Japan and perform a matched-sample comparison between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the findings of recent studies showing that international differentials in CEO pay have largely disappeared since the mid-2000s, our results show strikingly large differences between the Japanese and American systems that are difficult to explain by differences in conventional incentive contracts.