Formal finance involves the costly acquisition of information about distant entrepreneurs, while relationship-based finance allows financiers to fund a narrow circle of close entrepreneurs without acquiring costly information. In developing economies with low capital endowments, relationship-based finance is optimal because only high-quality entrepreneurs receive funding. However, formal finance may emerge in equilibrium, and it has the only effect of shifting rents from entrepreneurs to financiers. In more-developed economies with higher capital endowments, formal finance becomes necessary to prevent funding of low-quality entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, relationship-based financing may persist in equilibrium, and low-quality close entrepreneurs are funded even when there are high-quality distant entrepreneurs.

On August 12–13, 2005, the department of finance at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, collaborated with the Review of Financial Studies to host a conference titled “The Causes and Consequences of Recent Financial Market Bubbles.” This article begins with our overview of the themes and findings of the conference, and it ends with the questions that the literature has yet to answer.

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm׳s reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VCs, and IPO underwriters because they are perceived as ineffective monitors. In addition, VCs that fail to prevent fraud experience greater difficulty in taking future portfolio companies public.

We investigate IPO market efficiency using a sample of equity carve-outs offered during the period of 1985–2005. Unlike IPOs examined in previous studies where trading during the pre-IPO book-building period does not exist and trading on the IPO date is rationed, in equity carve-outs, investors can trade in the non-rationed market for shares of the parent, which holds a significant fraction of the subsidiary. We find that the subsidiary's initial day return is significantly related to its parent's return over the book-building period, but unrelated to its parent's contemporaneous return. Neither the pre-IPO price revision of the subsidiary nor the return to the parent on the initial trading day can be predicted. While the portion of the subsidiary's initial return unpredictable from information available during the book-building period is significantly related to its parent's contemporaneous return, the predictable component of the initial return is not. We interpret these results as evidence consistent with market efficiency.

We construct a mortality table for U.S. public companies during 1985–2006. We find that the age-specific mortality rates of firms initially increase, peaking at age three, and then decrease with age, implying that the first 3 years of public life are critical. Financial intermediaries involved around the “public birth” of a firm (e.g., venture capitalists (VCs) and high-quality underwriters) are associated with lower firm mortality rates, sometimes for up to 7 years after the initial public offering (IPO). VCs reduce mortality rates more through natal financial care than through selection, whereas high-quality underwriters affect firm mortality more through selection.

Exploiting China’s anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more corrupt environments experience larger productivity gains, higher growth of sales, and lower cost of debt than other firms. Taken together, our results suggest that corruption is an inefficient equilibrium for an economy because it creates negative externalities.

We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firm performance in emerging markets. Using a unique data set from China, we exploit the introduction of policies to attract talented emigrants and increase the supply of individuals with foreign experience in different provinces at different times. We document that performance increases after firms hire directors with foreign experience and identify the channels through which the emigration of talent may lead to a brain gain. Our findings provide evidence on how directors transmit knowledge about management practices and corporate governance to firms in emerging markets.

A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) generates negative externalities for industry competitors. To mitigate this threat, incumbent firms manage their earnings downward, issue more negative management forecasts, and use a more negative disclosure tone when their industry peers file for an IPO. Negative accruals reverse when the threat subsides. Incumbents manage earnings more aggressively when costs are small and benefits are large, and when they follow negative disclosures of industry leading incumbents. Such strategic disclosure lowers incumbent firm valuation multiples and associates with more negative IPO firm media sentiment. IPO firms obtain lower offer prices, raise less capital, and are more likely to withdraw from the offering. They also invest less, hoard more cash, and experience lower profitability post-IPO, whereas incumbents experience higher profitability and market share growth. Our results highlight the role of strategic reporting on product market competition and identify a new cost of going public.

We read all news items that came out between 1996 and 2000 on 458 Internet initial public offerings (IPOs) and a matching sample of 458 non-Internet IPOs (a total of 171,488 news items) and classify each news item as good news, neutral news, or bad news. We first document that the media were more positive for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic rise in share prices and more negative for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic fall in share prices. We then document that media hype is unable to explain the Internet bubble: A 1,646% difference exists in returns between Internet stocks and non-Internet stocks from January 1, 1997, through March 24, 2000 (the market peak), and the media can explain only 2.9% of that.