This paper investigates whether the initiation of trading in credit default swaps (CDSs) on a borrowing firm׳s outstanding debt is associated with a decline in that firm׳s reporting conservatism. CDS investments can modify lenders׳ payoffs on their loan portfolios by providing insurance on negative credit outcomes. The onset of CDS trading reduces lenders׳ incentives to continuously monitor borrowers and also their demand that borrowers report conservatively. Additionally, borrowers expect CDS-insured lenders to be more intransigent in renegotiations triggered by defaults and covenant violations. Since conservatism can trigger earlier covenant violations, borrowers have heightened incentives to report less conservatively in the post-CDS period. Using a differences-in-differences research design, we observe a decline in borrowing firms׳ reporting conservatism after CDS trade initiation. This effect is more pronounced when reputation costs lenders face from reducing monitoring are lower, when debt contracts outstanding at the time of CDS trade initiation have more financial covenants, and when lenders who monitor borrowers more regularly in the pre-CDS period enter into CDS contracts to hedge their credit exposures.

Various studies have investigated variation in reporting conservatism with pre-specified contractual incentives. Lawrence et al. (forthcoming), hereafter LSS, propose a model to control for “normal” or “non-discretionary” conservatism while testing for variation in conservatism with contractual forces, which they characterize as “discretionary” variation. Our objective is to further the discussion on discretion in conservatism by relying on LSS and incorporating insights from related studies to shed light on the rationales and relative importance of various controls for normal conservatism suggested by LSS. Furthermore, our perspective on discretion in conservatism is distinct from the one developed by LSS in some crucial respects, ultimately leading us to question the nature of the boundary between discretionary and non-discretionary conservatism.

We investigate if timely loss recognition is associated with acquisition-investment decisions. Using a Basu (1997) piece-wise linear regression model, we find that firms with more timely incorporation of economic losses into earnings make more profitable acquisitions, measured by the bidder's announcement returns and by changes in post-acquisition operating performance. These firms are also less likely to make post-acquisition divestitures (consistent with better ex ante investment decisions), but act more quickly to divest. We also find that the positive association between timely loss recognition and acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with higher ex ante agency costs.

We are among the first to investigate how Generative AI (GenAI) shapes investors' trading activities. Using an AI‐sentiment measure extracted from earnings‐call transcripts to proxy for textual signals, we find notable shifts in trading behaviors around earnings calls. Before the wide deployment of ChatGPT, short selling was aligned with AI‐sentiment, whereas retail trading was not. However, following ChatGPT's deployment, the alignment of retail traders with AI‐sentiment significantly increases, while the alignment of short sellers weakens, albeit insignificantly. Stocks with higher information processing costs exhibit a more pronounced increase in retail trading alignment, scenarios where retail investors are likely to benefit more from AI. Using retail‐AI alignment as a proxy for the extent to which retail investors trade based on AI signals, we show that information asymmetry declines and retail investors' trading profitability improves, whereas short sale profitability declines in high retail‐AI alignment stocks. Exogenous outages reduce the alignment between retail trading and AI‐sentiment, allowing us to draw causal inferences. Collectively, this study suggests that AI is a promising technology for narrowing the information gap in the trading of complex textual financial disclosures between investor classes with clear disparities in the ability to process public disclosures.

We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.

We examine the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct by estimating a structural model of the interactions between the SEC and a regulated firm. The SEC considers social costs, enforcement costs, and firms' compliance costs when making enforcement decisions. Identification exploits SOX as a shock to enforcement intensity. Four insights emerge from counterfactual analyses. First, marginal social costs have a greater impact on the SEC's perceived welfare than marginal enforcement costs. Second, the SEC's current enforcement mitigates earnings management to a level close to the first-best scenario. Third, a “hawkish” regulator, who perceives high social costs of financial misconduct, would impose excessive costs on society. Lastly, removing regulatory discretion would result in higher penalties and lower welfare, with little effect on earnings management.

Prior research posits that market imperfections and the lack of institutions that protect investor interests create a divergence between the cost of internal and external funds, thereby constraining firms' ability to fund investment projects through external financing. Financial constraints force firms to manage their cash flows to finance potentially profitable projects. A related stream of research documents that financial constraints due to costly external financing are more pronounced in underdeveloped financial markets. We examine the influence of financial development on the demand for liquidity by focusing on how financial development affects the sensitivity of firms' cash holdings to their cash flows. Using firm-level data for 35 countries covering about 12,782 firms for the years 1994–2002, we find the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows decreases with financial development. We also consider additional implications of firms' cash flow sensitivity of cash with respect to firm size and business cycles. Overall, we provide new cross-country evidence of the role of financial development on financial constraints.

Extant theoretical research posits that information asymmetry and agency issues affect the cost of external financing and hence impact the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities. In contrast, the literature on disclosure policy posits that expanded and credible disclosure lowers the cost of external financing and improves a firm's ability to pursue potentially profitable projects. An empirical implication is that disclosure can help firms grow by relaxing external financing constraints, thereby allowing capital to flow to positive net present value projects. This paper empirically evaluates this prediction using firm-level data over an 11-year period. As anticipated by theory, we find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and the externally financed growth rate, after controlling for other influences.

We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre‐bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post‐filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.

Consensus estimates, formed by taking an average of analyst forecasts, play an important role in capital markets (e.g., provide investors with a proxy for earnings expectations). We show I/B/E/S, a prominent information intermediary, removes 6% of one‐quarter‐ahead earnings forecasts before calculating the consensus, and among the 23% of firm‐quarters with at least one forecast removed, this figure rises to 16%. We provide evidence suggesting that I/B/E/S subjectively applies policies that govern its removal decisions and accepts feedback from firms that contributes to this subjectivity. Specifically, we find optimistic forecasts are removed more frequently than pessimistic forecasts, and such asymmetry increases further when removals allow firms to meet or beat the consensus. Furthermore, we find that these effects are more pronounced when managers’ incentives to just meet or beat the consensus are stronger (i.e., higher subsequent insider sales or higher compensation delta), or managers have greater ability to influence I/B/E/S. Lastly, we demonstrate that these subjective removals benefit I/B/E/S by improving consensus accuracy, explaining why I/B/E/S is willing to be influenced by firms.